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I. INTRODUCTION

ittle David slays the giant Goliath. A tiny cause, a pebble' from
young David's sling to the giant's temple, produces an improbable, disproportionately enormous effect.2 By analogy, a company barely misses analysts' earnings expectations, and the company's

* Partner, D'Amato & Lynch, New York, New York. B.A. 1971, George
Washington University; ID. 1974, University of Miami; LL.M. (in Tax) 1977,
New York University.
'The pebble David hurled at Goliath was taken from a river. Because of its oval
shape it flew like a discus. See generallySIRJ. GARDNER WILKINsON, A POPULAR
ACCOUNT
OF THE ANCET EGYPIANS 357-61 (1988).
2
See 1 Samuel 17.
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stock price plummets. Assuming liability, what is the measure of actual
damages? Is it the value of little David3 or the giant Goliath, the little miss
in earnings or the big drop in stock price? Are damages measured by the
magnitude of the cause or the magnitude of the effect?4 The answer turns
on the nature of the causation. Where the cause is direct-if hypothetically
David sneaked into Goliath's tent and stabbed the sleeping giant-the
measure is the worth of Goliath. But where the causation is indirect-the
giant was already dead or dying from the pebble in his brow when David
cut off Goliath's head with Goliath's own sword-the measure is the worth

' The value of David would be measured ex ante and be very low. See Franklin
M. Fisher & R. Craig Romaine, Janis Joplin s Yearbook and the Theory of
Damages, 5 J. ACCT. AUDITING & FIN. 145 (1990). The value of Goliath would
be measured ex ante and be very high. Analogizing a person killing another
person to damage to property may seem inapposite. But see James Lindgren,
Measuringthe Value ofSlaves andFreePersonsin Ancient Law, 71 CH.-KENT L.
REv. 149, 206 (1995) ("[A]ncient law systems are marked by the reduction of
people to their prices to a degree that looks almost incomprehensible to us.").
The story of David deals in several places with concepts of indirect causation.
For example, David sent Uriah, the Hittite, into battle to be killed so that David
could have Uriah's wife for himself. See 2 Samuel 11. David, on his deathbed, asked his son to kill someone David had vowed he would not himself kill.
See 1 Kings 2:8. David refused to allow his companion to kill Saul while he slept,
but armed with Goliath's sword, David joined the Philistine army to fight
against Saul and the Israelite army. See 1 Samuel 26, 28:1, 2; 29:2. However,
beyond causation the story of David is also about changes in one's value and
status. The story of David frequently has been compared with the popular 4000
year old Egyptian story of Sinuhe, which may have served as its literary prototype.
See The Story ofSinuhe, in THE LrrERATURE OF ANCIENT EGYPT 57, 64 & n.12,
74 (William Kelly Simpson ed. & R.O. Faulkner et al. trans., Yale Univ. Press
1972) [hereinafter The Story ofSinuhe]. In addition to his similar victory over a
champion of the enemy by use of a well-aimed projectile, Sinuhe enjoyed an
unprecedented rise in social position, particularly inthe vitally important event (for
an Egyptian) of his passing. "There was no commoner for whom the like had ever
been done. So I remained in / the favor of the king until the day of mooring came."
Id. at 74.
41It might seem an oxymoron to suggest that the measure
of a cause is not its
effect, but that is only the case if the effect is proportionate to the cause. The
proverbial example of a cause that had a wholly disproportionate effect is the straw
that broke the camel's back. Particularly in a case of indirect causation the effect
a cause has may be amplified or diminished along the causal chain. See infra notes
148-154.
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of little David. The same holds true in the case of the little miss in earnings
and the big drop in stock price.
The preeminent rule of damages to property today is related to the rule
of damages to property preeminent in antiquity. Today's rule is the fraud
on the market theory in securities litigation.6 Its ancient analogue is the rule
in which one person's ox gores the ox of another. The connection between
the old and new is that in both instances causation is indirect and attenuated. The injury is caused by the property or instrument of one person
injuring the property of another without the direct participation of either
person. I shall contrast the goring ox rule ("GOR"), approximately 4000
years old, with its modem counterpart, the fraud on the market theory
("FOM") which, despite its reach, is merely thirty years young.7

' The inspiration for this Article is the categorical statement by David Daube,
"an ox killing an ox... acquired pre-eminent importance in the Rabbinic law of
damages to property." DAVID DAUBE, The Civil Law of the Mishnah: The
Arrangement of the Three Gates [hereinafter DAUBE, The Civil Law of the
Mishnah],in 1COLLEcTED WORKS OFDAVIDDAUBE: TALMUDIC LAW 275 (Calum
M. Carmichael ed., 1992) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter WORKS OF DAVID
DAUBE]; see also BAVA KAMMA, THE TALMUD,TRACTATE BAVA KAMMA,
Artscrole series, intro. at xliv (R.Hersh Goldwurm ed., 1995) [hereinafter BAVA
KAMMA] ("One is liable for the damage done by his animal."). This applies to any
animal owned by the person, but the prototypical case used inthe Torah is the case
of one's ox. I am indebteded to Professor Calum Carmichael of Cornell Law
School, who is compiling Daube's work, for the bibliography of the Goring Ox
Rule ("GOR") and his advice and encouragement in writing this Article.
6 The fraud on the market theory, in its narrow sense, is a presumption that
investors rely upon prices set in an efficient market to reflect all material
information regarding a security. See generally Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
224 (1988). The theory suggests that damages are that quantifiable portion of the
price which represents the mispricing due to fraud.
7 See id. at 250-51. The
Supreme Court has adopted the fraud on the market
theory. Justice White, concurring in part and dissenting in part, bemoaned the fact
that the Court was adopting a doctrine of such brief lineage:
Even when compared to the relatively youthful private cause-of-action
under § 10(b), the fraud-on-the-market theory is amere babe. Yet today, the
Court embraces this theory with the sweeping confidence usually reserved
for more mature legal doctrines. In so doing, I fear that the Court's decision
may have many adverse, unintended effects as it is applied and interpreted
in the years to come.
Id. at 250 (citations omitted); see also Andrew R. Simmonds et al., Dealingwith
Anomalies, Confusion and Contradictionin Fraudon the Market SecuritiesClass
Actions, 81 KY. L.J. 123 (1992).
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II. THE GORING Ox RULE
Found in Exodus,8 the GOR provides for an ex ante division of loss: if
an ox (not known to be a habitual gorer, i.e., one that has gored oxen on
three prior occasions) 9 gores and kills another ox, the live ox is sold and the
proceeds of the sale together with the meat of the dead ox are divided
equally between the two owners. For ease I shall use the Hebrew and
Aramaic words for the habitual gorer: 'muad" (literally, its owner was
"warned") or mnemonically, "mad;" and for the tame ox: "tam." The rule
is that "in the case of a tam one pays [one-] half damages from the body of
[the animal], whereas in the case of a muad one pays full damages from the
...
[choicest of the owner of the muad's properties]."'" It is the former

8
9

Exodus 21:35.

An obvious difference between the GOR and modem securities litigation is that
there is a much higher standard for finding an ox muad than finding scienterunder the
securities laws. By analogy, most securities "fraud" suits are tam and tam principles
of causation apply. My purpose here, however, is notto consider the appropriate level
ofscienter for a finding ofliability under the securities laws, but rather to examine the
rules of causation and damages that flow from a lesser level ofscienter, recklessness
for example. Issues of apportionment of causation and damages are far more
important and developed in the case of a tam than in the case ofamuad. Damages for
a muad are straightforward: one pays full damages. In the case of a tam the loss is
apportioned, split and shared based upon causation. See Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act ("PSLRA") of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(3) (1999), providing for
proportionate liability where the violation was not a "knowing" violation. For
knowing violations, joint and several liability remains the rule. See id.
o BAVA KAMMA, supra note 5, at 16b3. In Exodus 21, the GOR is part of a
larger scheme of damage measures caused by an ox goring, as follows: (1) If an ox
killed a man, it lost all commercial value because it was killed and its meat could
not be eaten; (2) if the ox was muad towards people, its owner was killed as well;
(3) if a tam killed another ox, it was sold and the proceeds of the sale and meat of
the dead ox were divided between the owners; and (4) if the ox was muad toward
other oxen, its owner was liable for the full ex ante value of the dead ox but was
permitted to keep (as salvage) the meat of the dead ox. This four-part rule produces
a matrix of twelve possible outcomes, six as to the oxen, and six as to the owners.
See Exodus 21. Regarding the rule of an ox killing a person, see JACOB J.
FNKELSTEn, THE Ox THAT GORED 6 (1981). The law of the goring ox is "a legal
and politico-philosophical doctrine of extraordinary power. The essence of this
doctrine is the transcending power of sovereignty." Id.; see also Jacob J.
Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands,
Forfeitures,WrongfulDeathandthe Western Notion ofSovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q.
169 (1973) [hereinafter Finkelstein, Goring Ox]; PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF
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situation that is of particular interest. Hence, the term GOR herein refers to
the case of the tam ox that gores another ox. It is the famous rule of onehalf damages.
Where the two oxen were of roughly equal value the result was an
equal sharing of the loss. However, where the oxen were of very disparate
values small causes could produce great effects, and vice versa; applying
the rule too literally might cause anomalies to occur." Thus, where a very
valuable ox was killed, whose meat was worth more than double the value
of the goring ox, in receiving half the meat of the victim, the owner of the
gorer would make a profit! Likewise, where a very valuable ox killed a
very inexpensive ox, if the valuable animal was sold and the proceeds were
divided equally, the owner of the inexpensive dead ox might make a profit!
However, reductio ad absurdum, the law was not interpreted so as to
produce such manifestly unjust results."2
Mindful of the apparent purpose of the rule, the fair division of loss,
the Talmudrecorded a modified GOR providing that damages were half the
value of the victim, rather than half the value of the gorer.1 The Talmudic
JEWS 33-34 (1987) ("'The Law of the Goring Ox' testifies to the huge
importance that the Mosaic code attaches to human life.... [M]an is made in
God's image, and so life is not just valuable, it is sacred.").
11See BERNARD S. JACKSON, Essays in Jewish andComparativeLegalHistory,
in 10 STuDiES IN JUDAIsM IN LATE ANnQUITY ch. 5, at 134 (Jacob Neusner ed.,
1975) [hereinafter STUDiEs IN JUDAISM] ("Only in two types of case does a literal
application of the rule (assuming an equal division of the price) appear to create
injustice."). These unusual, aberrant, disparate consequences and connections
between causes and effects (a small, less valuable ox killing a big, valuable ox, for
example) are found in the GOR and in Rule 10(b)-5 (of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act) damages, but not in the corporate law "fairness" or nominal
damages of Meinhardv. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928). See infra PartIV.
12The owner of the very inexpensive gorerwould not make aprofitbecause the
owner of the valuable victim could simply not seek legal redress. The owner of the
very inexpensive victim would not make a profit because, if he did, the liability of
a tam would be greater than the liability of a muad. See generally DAVID DAUBE,
Rabbinic Methods oflnterpretationandHellenisticRhetoric [hereinafter Daube,
Rabbinic Methods], in WORKS OF DAVID DAUBE, supranote 5, at 333. According
to Daube, the teachings of the Hellenistic rhetorical schools pervaded the entire
Mediterranean world so that to a degree the same interpretive techniques might be
found everywhere. These rhetorical techniques were used by the Pharisees to derive
references from the Torah supporting the oral traditions and to prevail over the
criticisms of the Sadducees.
3 See BAVA KAMMA supra note 5, at 3:9; Reuven Yaron, The Goring Ox in
NearEasternLaws, ISR.L. REv. (1966), reprintedin JEWISH LAwINANCIENTAND
THE
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modification was sensible in that damages should be viewed from the
perspective of the injury done to the victim. Since the Talmudic teaching
does not govern except where the oxen were of different values (a subject
not discussed in Exodus), it does no violence to the rule in the Torah.
However, where the oxen were of different values the Talmudic formulation was more favorable to the owner of the more valuable ox. Under the
formulation of Exodus, the owner of the less valuable animal was
subsidized.'4 But since damages for the tam were payable "from the body
of" the tam, under the Talmudic formulation its owner's risk of loss was
still limited, i.e., to the full value of his ox, as opposed to half its value
under Exodus.
III. THE HISTORICAL BASIS OF THE GORING Ox RULE

The earliest known example of the GOR is found in the Laws of
Eshnunna,'5 which predates both the laws of Hammurabi and Moses.
Located between the Tigres and Euphrates Rivers, near modem Baghdad,
MODERNISRAEL 50,54 (1971). The Talmud says that the rule in Exodus pertained
to two oxen of relatively equal value. In the case of a comparatively inexpensive
ox goring a very expensive ox, the result under the Talmudic formulation is more
like the Roman rule of the day: the owner of the aggressor pays for the damages
done, subjectto noxal surrender (i.e., he surrenders the gorernoxally in satisfaction
of the debt). The logic is as follows:
All agree that the owner of a tam is liable for only half damages, and thus
he and the damaged party share the loss equally. Accordingly, when the
verse states that both oxen are sold and the proceeds are divided by the two
parties, it must refer to a case in which this will result in each party
suffering half of the loss.
BAVA KAMMA, supranote 5, at 34a2 n. 13. Since the loss was the value of the dead
ox, the measure of damages was half the value of the dead ox. The Talmud also
extends the GOR to situations in which two oxen fight and are injured but do not
die. See id. at 33a2.
4
It is interesting that the GOR has, to some degree, a socialistic feature. Those
with a common interest, soldiers or sailors, owners of cargo aboard ship or owners
of oxen, deal with each other upon the principle of "all for one, and one for all,"
and "from each according to his ability, and to each according to his need."
Interestingly, such principles seem to have more efficacy in intimate private
ventures for profit than in the broader public realm.
5
See Yaron, supra note 13; see also Saul Levmore, Rethinking Comparative
Law: Variety and Uniformity in Ancient andModern Tort Law, 61 TUL. L. REV.
235, 248 & n.33, 249, 268 (1986) ("In verse 35 of Exodus, we find the very same
splitting rule that is found in section 53 of the Laws of Eshnunna."). Id. at 268.
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and a few hundred miles from ancient Ur, Eshnunna was an independent
city-state that lost its independence during the reign of Hammurabi. 6
Found in both the Laws of Eshnunna and in Exodus, the GOR "offer(s) the
closest parallel between Biblical law and another ancient Near Eastern
code.""7 Other than in the Laws of Eshnunna and Exodus, the GOR has not
been found in any other ancient legal system.
Although clearly very old and well-established, the historical rationale
for the GOR is obscure. However, the practical basis for the rule seems to
be the relationship of the owners of the oxen as co-venturers and the
uncertain sequence of causation in a fight between the oxen. In order to
appreciate the relationship of the owners and the uncertainty of causation,
I must examine the utilization of oxen.
The domestication of cattle predates recorded history. Prehistoric
nomads who learned to control herds (such as the reindeer herds) soon
realized the benefits of castration in managing their herds. 8 But beyond the
benefits to the nomad, the domestication of cattle created the earliest and
most important plough animal, expanding the possibilities of large-scale
agriculture. As far back as is known, the Egyptians maintained herds of
cattle.' 9 The behavior of cattle has not changed.

6See Levmore, supra note 15, at 248 n.33.
171d. at 268-69.
18 See PHLIP VAN DOREN STERN, PREHISTORC EUROPE 213, 217 (1969);
MARTIN WATTS, WORKING OXEN 4, 19 (1999) (The earliest evidence of
domestication of cattle is found in the Middle East around ten thousand years ago.
Prior to canals and railways oxen were the main movers of heavy loads. They
transported, for example, the Conestoga Wagons to the West. Oxen were employed
thousands of years before the horse. The horse began to rival the ox in the late preChristian period and supplant the ox in the nineteenth century. The advantages of
the ox were that it ate cheaper food and at the end of its days had some value.); see
also ARTHUR CANNON, THE BULLOCK DRIVER'S HANDBOOK 9, 78, 89, 114-15
(1985); LuIGI GIANOLI, HORSES AND HORSEMANSHIP THROUGH THE AGES 11-17
(Iris Brooks trans., 1967); GLENN R. VERNAM, MAN ON HORSEBACK 5-8, 13
(1964).
9For example, the Egyptian hero Sinuhe describes his conquest ofthe enemy's
champion: "I brought away his possessions, I seized his cattle. What he had thought
to do to me I did to him. I took away what was in his tent. I uncovered his camp,
and it was abundant for me therein. I became rich in treasure, a great proprietor of
cattle." The Story ofSinuhe, supra note 3, at 65. Cattle were to the Egyptians as
sheep were to the Israelites. David is the archetypal good shepherd, caring for his
flock to the point of seizing lambs from the clutches of lions and bears. Sinuhe
relates that his adversary planned to make off with his cattle: "I am like a bull of
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Oxen2 ° are more productive in teams.2 Oxen are not guided by reins,
a bit, or other control of their muzzle. They are trained to obey voice
commands, and they walk a straighter line in twos. They calm and reinforce
each other. Typically, a single team is used, but for heavier work many
oxen teams may be used. Animals in teams are competitive, but competitiveness creates conflicts which may erupt into violence, particularly when
the owners are not with their animals.22
a grazing herd in the midst of another herd. The bull of the kine attacks him,! but
the (Egyptian) bull prevails against him." Id. at 64. See also ADOLF ERMAN, LIFE
IN ANCIENT EGYPT (H.M. Tirard trans., 1971) ("[O]f all domestic animals the ox

was the dearest to the heart of the Egyptian .... The Egyptians talked to their oxen
as we talk to our dogs; they gave them names and decked out the finest with
coloured cloths and pretty fringes .... ) (citations omitted). For a more detailed
account of cattle in very ancient Egypt, see NICHOLAS
ANCIENT EGYPT
20Oxen

GRIMAL,

A HISTORY OF

18-25 (Ian Shaw trans., 1992).

are castrated bull cattle.

Regarding the technology of oxen, see generally CANNON, supra note 18;
DREW CONROY, OXEN: A TEAmSTERS GuIDE (1999); S.J. SKINNER, ESSAY ON THE
ADVANTAGES OF OXEN, FARMERS BARN BOOK (Joseph H. Townley ed., 1908)
(The oxen team is turned in the direction of the smaller near-ox. The larger off-ox
naturally pulling ahead of the other would fear the horn of the near-ox were a turn
attempted in the direction ofthe off-ox.); WATrs, supranote 18, at 17; Midwest Ox
Drover's Ass'n Home Page (visited Mar. 8, 2000) <http://www.execpc.com/
oxdrover/>. Another source is Rural Heritage, publisher of books and magazines
regarding farming and logging with horses, mules, and oxen. See RuralHeritage
Home Page(visited Mar. 23,2000) <http://www.ruralheritage.com>. I am indebted
to Drew Conroy, Associate Professor, University of New Hampshire for sharing
with me his extensive knowledge and experience on the habits of cattle and oxen.
Otherwise unattributed observations regarding oxen and cattle are from Professor
Conroy.
' Regarding competition in sled dogs exacerbated by humans in order to
2!

increase their productivity, see JACK LONDON, WHITE FANG (1926) and CALL
OF THE WILD (1929). Regarding owners not being with their property,
compare Exodus 22:13-14; BAVA METZIA 8:1-3 (stating that one who hires a cow

is liable for its demise if its owner not be hired with the cow), with Ralli v. Troop,
157 U.S. 386 (1895) (noting that originally merchants traveledwith their cargo, but
that as mercantile practice developed merchants no longer traveled with their
cargo). See also infra note 50. In Norman England, a villein together with his oxen
served his lord by tilling the lord's land on those days when the lord had a claim
on him. See GEORGE MACAULAY TREVELYAN, A SHORTENED HISTORY OF
ENGLAND 132 (1971); WATrs, supra note 18, at 6 (The Doomsday Book reveals
that English agriculture in the early Norman period was almost totally geared to
oxen.).
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In the case of oxen, without human intervention they are naturally
competitive and hierarchial. Indeed, oxen generally tend to lock horns and
butt heads. They instinctively maintain a strict pecking order. They will
constantly jostle and fight. The closer in size and the higher the individuals
are in the herd's pecking order, the greater the chance of a major battle.
The better the animals know each other, the less the chance of a major
conflict. Yet, even in a herd whose animals have lived together peacefully
for most of their lives, there will be a day when the underlying tensions
erupt.2
The owners of oxen possess only limited ability to control the risk of
gorings. Despite millenia of selective breeding, humans have not eliminated from the genetic nature of cattle, particularly the males of the species,
the instinct to fight. Indeed, it is not clear that eliminating the instinct to
fight with their horns would be beneficial, since the instinct to charge
forward apparently makes the animal more productive. Moreover, there has
not been much need to prevent fighting because it rarely results in
significant injury. Most of the time oxen give in to the stronger animal long
before there is any chance of physical damage. In addition, castration has
been a sufficient means of taming aggression without reducing the animal's
24
strength.
Furthermore, one cannot efficiently segregate cattle; they are herd
animals. Even those on the lowest end of the pecking order prefer being
with a herd to solitary quarters. Cattle can be kept together in a pasture with
much less effort than by corralling or housing them in solitary quarters.
Cattle strongly dislike being alone. They will crash down gates, jump
fences and run far to be with other cattle, even if it means that they will
have to fight with the other cattle. Furthermore, their horns cannot be
removed because oxen need them to move cargo downhill25 and to prevent
the yoke from slipping over their heads. Indeed, primitive harnesses were
attached to their horns.26
23

See

CONROY, supra note 21; WATTs, supra note 18, at 17

("Individual

animals get very attached to their working partners and their overall position in the
team, and it is not easy to make changes!").
24 See CONROY,

supranote 21; WATrs, supra note 18, at 17 ("The docility of
the ox is legendary: this is due partly to castration and partly to the tendency of
bovines to face a threat rather than run from it.").
' See CONROY, supra note 21. Thus, for example, under Hammurabi's Code
if a person hired an ox and broke off one of its horns, he had to pay one-fourth of
the ox's value. Note also that the loss of a horn would alter the pecking order and
cause
fighting.
26 See
id.; WATrs, supra note 18, at 23 (The earliest yokes, head yokes, were
inefficient. An ox exerts his greatest strength with his head down, pushing rather
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Thus, for well over 4000 years, dating back to the era of nomadic
herders, humans have engaged in joint enterprises involving animals.
However, beyond the interaction of the oxen with their human owners, the
owners of oxen were themselves co-venturers due to the nature of oxen to
socialize in the pecking order of the herd. The GOR envisioned that oxen
owned by different owners would come into contact with one another and
therefore supplied a rule of damages for resulting mishaps.'
In the competitive hierarchy of the herd, the weaker, smaller, younger
ox might instigate a challenge and the older, stronger, larger animal
retaliate. Thus, that one killed is not indicative of which ox was the
instigator or aggressor.2 8The live ox may have been fending off a challenge
by an aggressive competitor and, hence, be justified. Moreover, since it is
simply the instinct of oxen to butt heads, fights were unavoidable in any
event. Since such fighting among oxen rarely produced serious injury, little
purpose was served in trying to prevent it.
Oxen are well suited to locking horns or butting heads.29 They can take
a great deal of abuse about the horns, head, neck and shoulders. Picture, for
example, a matadorial contest. Indeed, oxen are able to withstand a great
deal of pain and injury. However, oxen have a very large gut. It is very
unusual for one animal to attack the gut of another. But when locking horns
or butting heads one animal may slip or fall and the other lunge forward,
puncturing the gut of the fallen animal. A puncture of the gut is rarely
directly or immediately fatal. Rather, the bacteria released from the gut
multiply and produce toxins causing peritonitis, septicemia and localized
necrosis.3" Such injuries were unusual and unpreventable, but were known
than27pulling.).
See Exodus 21:35.
28 See DAUBE, The Civil Law of the Mishnah, supra note 5; DAVID DAUBE,
Directand Indirect Causation in BiblicalLaw, in VETUS TESTAMENTUM H 246
(1961) [hereinafter DAUBE, DirectandIndirect Causation];Levmore, supranote
15, at 252 ("Uncertain causality may... be behind [the] ... splitting rule.").
Levmore describes the GOR and the Law of General Average as "responses to the
problem of non negligent loss." Id. at 254. He does not view the splitting rules as
a compromise between strict liability and no liability without fault. Rather, they are
"more accurately described as subtle examples of comparative negligence." Id. It
is subtle indeed that a comparative negligence rule exists as to causation and
damages in a case where liability is not based on fault. Levmore seems to be
suggesting that there is strict liability, but damages are measured as though there
been comparative fault. See Yaron, supra note 13, at 52.
had29
See ERMAN, supra note 19.
3 oSee Letter from Drew Conroy, Associate Professor, University of New
Hampshire, to Andrew R. Simmonds 2 (Jan. 22, 2000) (on file with author). A
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to be serious and often fatal complications of the natural competitive
activities of oxen.
Thus, the purpose of the GOR was not deterrence in that owners should
prevent their oxen (other than the habitually vicious ox) from fighting other
oxen. Rather, the owners assumed the risk, accepting instead an arrangement to share unusual, abnormally-caused losses. It was better ex ante for
the owners participating in the venture to have big, strong, competitive
oxen pulling at the yoke, and risk those rare gorings that produced serious
injury or death (provided the liability was not excessive), than to employ
weaker oxen lower in the pecking order, or oxen that malingered, but rarely
gored. The splitting of damages found in the GOR was not designed to
punish fault of the owners or as an incentive to be careful. The purpose of
the rule was to offer an incentive for collective action3 1 in future competitive environments. Damages were simply a function of economic policy as
a measure of how much the owner of the live ox should be required to
compensate the owner of the victim in order to induce them both to incur
the risk. The measure of compensation was an implied agreement between
owners entering into a joint enterprise.
The GOR seems to be related to two other ancient rules: the laws of
prize and capture" and the Law of General Average.33 All three rules
provide for an ex ante division.34
Booty and prize laws provide an ex ante, before-the-battle agreement
on the division of the spoils.35 The division of the spoils was not based

disadvantage of oxen compared to horses is that oxen must spend a portion of the
day31grazing to fill their gut. Horses can be fed at the beginning and end of the day.
Regarding encouraging investment and enterprise, see Parable ofthe Talents,
Matthew 25:14-30;Luke 19:11-27.
32 See JACKSON, supra note 11 (discussing Z.W. FALK, BIBLICA 51 (1970))
(disagreeing with Falk and finding the analogy to the Biblical law of booty
unconvincing because the division occurred between those who fought and those
who stayed with the baggage). But that is precisely the point of indirect causation.
Those who stayed with the baggage contributed, albeit indirectly.
33 See Levmore, supra note 15 (The Law of General
Average in admiralty law
contains a similar response to the GOR with respect to uncertain causation.).
' Regarding ex ante bargains, see Matthew L. Iwicki, Note, Accountingfor
Relational Financing in the Creditors' Ex Ante Bargain:Beyond the General
Average Model,76 VA. L. REV. 815 (1990) (arguing that ex ante bargains solve the
problem of non-cooperation orholdoutinthe prisoner's dilemma and the collective
action problem in the case of unforeseeable risks).
3 See United States v. Steever, 113 U.S. 747 (1885) (A tiny launch captured a
disproportionately large and valuable ship. The captain ofthe launch argued in vain
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upon an after-the-fact measure of valor, nor was the business of warfare left
to a race of conquest. 6 Thus, for example, the Biblical law of booty
promulgated by David provides for the sharing of spoils equally between
the actual combatants and those who stayed with the baggage. 37 (However,
the latter paid a higher tax out of their share.) The story of David's
nemesis, Saul, also provides a lesson regarding the ancient law of booty.
The Lord commanded Saul to exterminate Amalek down to its "women,
children and infants, oxen, sheep, camels and asses."38 But Saul did not
destroy everyone and everything, an act sometimes incorrectly interpreted
through modem eyes as "mercy." In its Biblical context Saul had taken the
Lord's spoils that were forbidden to him. Confronted, Saul unsuccessfully
dissembled that he had temporarily spared the most valuable of the spoils
(the enemy king and the best oxen and sheep) to sacrifice to the Lord ex
post, after the battle.3 9
The ancient custom of an ex ante division of spoils was extremely
widespread and existed in our law until this century.4" Often, since spoils

that he should share in the manner of the crewmen, according to pay scale, rather
than in the manner of the officers, according to a set percentage.). Post hoc
reallocations of booty were contrary to the accepted rule. In Homer's iliad,
Agamemnon's demand that Achilles give up his prize, the fair-cheekedBriseis, was
an arrogant ex post reallocation in breach of the ancient rules of prize and capture.
Agamemnon's refusal to accept a father's ransom for his enslaved daughter was
likewise a breach of custom, while his excuse for doing so, that he liked her better
than his wife, was a disgrace. See HOMER, THE ILIAD AND ODYSSEY (William
Sotheby trans., 1834).
36The ex ante arrangements to divide spoils are reminiscent
of the custom of
European restaurants to divide the service gratuity added to customers' bills
between the waiter and those working in the kitchen. Equitable distribution rules
of marital dissolution also come to mind where, for example, one spouse indirectly
contributes to the other's success. There is also a custom among fishermen to agree
ex ante to share in a proportion of the catch. See ROBERT CUSHMAN MURPHY, A
DEAD WHALE ORA STOVE BOAT 170 (1967); Letter from Richard Ford to Andrew

Simmonds (Mar. 20, 2000) (on file with author). Old whaleman's shipping papers
showed that on whaling ships a very skilled person like a harpooner would receive
more shares than an unskilled seaman. The same custom existed among pirates. See
ROBERT CARSE, THE AGE OF PIRACY 3-7 (1957); SAVIOUR PIROTA, PIRATES AND
TREASURE (1995); PATRICK PRINGLE, JOLLY ROGER, THE STORY OF THE GREAT

AGE OF PIRACY 106-13 (1953).
37 See Numbers 31:27-47;
38

1 Samuel 30:24.

1 Samuel 30:15.

See id. at 15:28.
But one among many examples of the custom of division of spoils is the
"Islamic custom, [that] soldiers would be allowed three days in which to pillage a
40
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such as a ship cannot be divided, the prize was condemned in a prize court
and the proceeds of the sale (similarly to the sale in the GOR) were
divided. Moreover, compensation for military service was very important
in antiquity. In ancient times military endeavors were one of very few
opportunities, irrespective of social class, for the acquisition of personal
ownership of property." The strict codes of conduct were relaxed as an
incentive for military success. Concessions by the law to the lust of the
conqueror were seen as the lesser of two evils.42
The Law of General Average also derives from remote antiquity,
spanning the law of Rhodes through the law of Rome.4 3 It provides (in the
typical case) that where a crew caught in a storm cuts down the ship's mast
or jettisons a portion of the cargo in order to save the ship, the crew, and
the remainder of its cargo, the owners of the ship and the owners of the
surviving cargo share the loss proportionately. It is as though the owner of
the ox and the owner of cargo on a ship have an interest in the remainder
of the venture that survives the loss of their own contribution to the venture
when the loss was due to an abnormal event not directly caused by any of

[captured] city, whose treasure would be fairly apportioned among them." LORD
KINROSS, THE OTTOMAN CENTURIES, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE TURKISH EMPIRE

106 (1977). The United States has held no prize courts since 1899, though the

practice has continued in Europe. See HANsWEHBERG, CAPTURE IN WARON LAND
SEA (1911) (discussing the first principles of the law of prize on sea and land
and pointing out that the United States has always upheld the idea of the
inviolability of private property).
41 Rules of partiarchy, pater familias and primogeniture were stifling. Jacob
swindled Esau out of his birthright, fled, and worked for Laban for "twice seven
years" as a virtual slave to obtain his daughters in matrimony. However, when
Jacob left with his wives Laban accused Jacob of treating his daughters as war
booty. See Genesis 31:26. The position of women was doubly difficult. They
derived their property rights by contract through male relatives. See Tal Ilan, How
Women Differed, BIBLICAL ARCHAEOLOGY REv., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 38.

AND

42See DAVID DAUBE, Concessions to Sinfulness in Jewish Law, in WORKS OF
DAVID DAUBE, supra note 5, at 1, 11. It was a widespread ancient custom that

women of a conquered people were treated as part of the victor's booty. See
Genesis 31:26. However, this practice engendered the poison of resentment and
perverted ambition. See AEsCHyLUs, AESCHYL AGAMEMNON (Martin L. West ed.,
1991); SOPHOCLE,WOMENOFTRACHIS (C.K. Williams & Gregory W. Dickerson
trans., 1978).
" See Ralli v. Troop, 157 U.S. 386,397 (1895); HENRYN. LONGLEY, COMMON
CARRIAGE OF CARGO 235 (1967); see also Steven F. Friedell, Admiralty and the
Sea ofJewish Law, 27 J. MAR. L. & COM. 647 (1996). Regarding the analogy of a
storm at sea or other natural disasters to securities prices, see infra note 144.
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the owners. 44 The "doctrine applies only where something, which is part of
the common adventure, is sacrificed solely for the benefit of the rest of the
adventure." 45 The authority of the master to jettison property aboard ship
derives "from the implied consent of all concerned in the common
46
adventure."
IV. MEINHARD V.SALMON: RELATIONSHIP, NOT FAULT

In each case, of the soldiers and sailors, the owners of cargo aboard
ship and the owners of oxen as co-venturers, liability was strict. It was not
premised upon a failure of honesty, "but the punctilio of an honor the most
' It was based on the notion of "all for one, and one for all." The
sensitive."47
rule is agnostic as to fault or merit; in any event, the GOR assumes the two
owners are blameless.48 Similarly, it was not the most valiant in battle who

4 It is as though the owners became partners in the goring ox. See BAVA
KAMMA, supra note 5, at 33a4. Note, however, that the rule of sharing of losses
does not apply to such cases as cargo taken by pirates or an ox attacked by a lion.
The loss must be due to an internal conflict in the venture brought about by
aberational external causes.
4SRalli, 157 U.S. at 395.
IId.at 398 (In more distant antiquity merchants traveled with their cargo and
had to consent to its being jettisoned. When the practice changed and merchants no
longer traveled with their cargo, the rule remained that the consent of the owner
was necessary to deal with his goods, but consent being unobtainable from the
distant owner was implied.).
47Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (finding liability based
on the relationship among co-venturers rather than on fault); cf OLivERWENDELL
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 76 (1881) (stating let the loss lie where it falls);
Finkelstein, Goring Ox, supranote 10, at 262-64 ("[T]he doctrine of 'no liability
without fault' [which is the justification for] ... 'losses will lie where they fall' is
a 19th century extrapolation that can claim no... pedigree, having been prompted
by socio-economic priorities felt at the time rather than by fidelity to the
Judeo-Christian and common law tradition[s]. ..

."). For

the history of the doc-

trine, see E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the
DisgorgementPrinciplein Breach of Contract,94 YALE L.J. 1339, 1351 (1985);
see also Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The FiduciaryRelationship:Its
Economic Characterand Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045 (1991)
(analyzing the economic character of the fiduciary relationship based upon selfinterest incentive structures using the principal-agent model).
48See JACKSON, supra note 11, at 132; Yaron, supra note 13. In Meinhardv.
Salmon, Judge Cardozo acknowleged that Salmon was blameless. See Meinhard,
164 N.E. at 547.
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received the most spoils, nor was the issue of fault (or merit) relevant to the
owners of cargo aboard ship in a storm or to the owners of oxen. The only
duty that was imposed was a duty of loyalty and disclosure so that each
party knew where he stood and to what he was entitled.
Likewise, in American corporate law a breach of a duty of fairness,
loyalty or disclosure need not be intentional, or indeed due to fault, in order
to be actionable. 9 Furthermore, no distinction is drawn in this regard
between joint venturers, partners, corporate directors, or majority shareholders." The same rule applies to all of them as to owners of oxen. The
basis of liability is not fault, but rather the relationship of ownership of
property used in an enterprise. However, as David Daube points out, the
word "owner" is an "unsatisfactory approximation: the German Herr would
be nearer." 51 That is, the "lord," the "master," the "boss" or the one
responsible or in control.5 2 In this context the word "owner" denoted a
certain status, to wit, the master of the ox.
But it would be a mistake to equate the GOR with Meinhard v.
Salmon,5 3 Weinberger v. UOP,I or other cases dealing with the associations, relationships and duties between co-venturers, trustees, partners,
majority shareholders and corporate directors. 5 Perhaps a relationship or
49See Weinbergerv. UOP,

Inc., 517 A.2d 653,654 (Del. Ch. 1986); ReginaM.
Giannini, "PunctilioofHonor" or "DisintegratingErosion
"? The FiduciaryDuty
to DiscloseforPartners,CorporateDirectors,andMajority Shareholders,27 Sw.
U. L. REv. 73, 87 (1997). Under Delaware corporate law nominal damages are
recoverable. Under the federal securities laws, conversely, only actual damages are
awarded. See In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., 634 A.2d 319, 333 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1993)
('In Delaware existing law and policy have evolved into a virtual per se rule of
damages for breach of the fiduciary duty of disclosure."). However, the Delaware
Supreme Court inLoudonv. Archer-Daniels-MidlandCo., 700 A.2d 135,146 (Del.
1997), held that Ti-Starwas limited to its facts ("Where is no per se rule that
would allow damage for all director breaches of fiduciary duty of disclosure ....
Damages will be available only in circumstances where disclosure violations are
concomitant with deprivation to shareholders' economic interests or impairment
of their voting rights.").
1o See Farnsworth, supra note 47; Giannini, supranote 49.
51 DAuBE, Direct andIndirect Causation,supra note 28.
5 Control need not be actual, as for example,
the soldiers that stayed with the
baggage, the merchant that did not travel with his cargo, the owners that were not
with their oxen, etc. But see supranote 22 (liability for a borrowed cow depended
upon whether its owner was borrowed with the cow).
53Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y.
1928).
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 517 A.2d 653 (Del. Ch. 1986).
55See, e.g., Louden v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.,
700 A.2d 135 (Del. 1997);
Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1995); Cede &
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association in a venture was the genesis of the GOR, but the sharing of
damages is more like the case of a market decline in the value of one's
investment than the nominal (for procedural violations) or fair value of
one's investment damages under corporate law. The GOR is a chimera
because, although liability is strict, fault is absent (as in Meinhard v.
Salmon), and damages are relaxed and calculated as though it was a case
of comparative negligence 6 and not a breach of fiduciary duty or trust.
V. Loss CAUSATION

The foremost reason for liability and the measure of damages in the
GOR was not a breach of duty or trust or the relationship among the
owners; it was the juxtaposition of "but for" and loss causation. The
immediate cause of injury was readily apparent from the effect, the wound.
Even though the victim may have died slowly of peritonitis and septicemia,
necrotic changes at the puncture site and the general condition of the
animal undergoing a hideous death due to a puncture of the animal's
gut
made the cause obvious from the result. It would have been manifestly
unfair to deny recovery where the cause of the victim's death was so
clearly due to the goring by the live ox. Furthermore, the loss of an ox to
a farmer having only one or a few oxen with which to plough his field, to
grow crops and to feed his family was a tremendous loss jeopardizing the
family's very survival. Purportedly, early Americans who lost an ox on
occasion put themselves in the yoke to keep the wagon moving until a
replacement could be found.57
While the immediate cause of injury was unmistakably clear, loss
causation was unclear and speculative. Since the animals were naturally
competitive, and indeed both owners may have encouraged the competition
between their animals by selecting the strongest animals (i.e., those highest
in the herd's pecking order), either ox might have misbehaved first. The
gorer may have only been defending itself. Perhaps the oxen locked horns
and the wound was due to the victim unexpectedly tripping or falling,
causing the gorer to lunge forward to the victim's gut. To borrow an
analogy, it is like the case of a person who fell while carrying a flask of

Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1993);In re Tri-star Pictures,
634 A.2d 319 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1993).
16 See Levmore, supranote 15, at 254-55 ("These rules may be more accurately
described as subtle examples of comparative negligence than as compromises
between
strict liability and negligence.").
57
See Letter from Drew Conroy, supra note 30.
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precious liquid, breaking it on a stone. We know the stone caused the
58
damage, but we do not know what caused the fall.
The importance of principles of indirect causation in the GOR is
demonstrated by the Talmud, which expands the facts from two to three
oxen owned by three different owners. 59 Hypothetically, one of the three
oxen is gored and killed, and it is unclear which of the other two did the
goring. Now the automatic liability of GOR no longer applied: there was
no (socialistic) sharing of the loss among the three owners. The owner of
the victim had to prove which of the two (or more) live oxen was responsible, the larger or the smaller, the tam or the muad. The GOR created an
incentive structure, where multiple oxen were involved, for the owner of
the victim to claim that the more valuable ox did it, or that the muad did it,
not the tam. In these cases the eminently sensible rule applied that
' 6
"whoever seeks to take money from his fellow must bring the proof."
'
61
Another rule, the "rule of wheat and barley, provided a disincentive
for the owner of the victim to claim that the more valuable or the muad was
the gorer. Under the rule of wheat and barley, where the plaintiff claimed
he lost the more valuable he thereby waived any claim to the less valuable.
Where the plaintiff claimed the muad did it, he waived any claim as to the
tam, and where he claimed the large ox did it, he waived any claim as to the
small ox. 62 The plaintiff, who claimed the greater, waived any claim of
damages as to the lesser.
Thus, adding a third ox to the facts of the GOR produced a situation in
which, notwithstanding the relationship among the owners, the owner of
the victim, who did not bring the proof, would recover nothing, and the
causal role of one or the other oxen causing the injury to the victim became
the crucial threshold issue. A mere relationship of co-owners of oxen in a
venture, without proof that a specific ox caused the injury, did not give rise
to liability. Yet in all events the broad rule of causation and damages in the
GOR still applied. The aspect of causation and damages in the GOR trumps
the aspect of ownership. The most the owner of the victim could recover

58See

BAVA KAMMA, supra note 5, at 28b2.
'9See id. at 35a2.
6
1Id. Note also that a division of a whole into more than two parts involves
considerable mathematical complexity. See Sarah Boxer, ForBirthdayPartiesor
LegalParties;DividingThings Fairlyis NotAlways a Pieceof Cake, N.Y. TuviEs,
Aug. 7, 1999, at B7 (providing a review of recent books on the history of attempts
to solve this problem).
61 See BAVA KAMMA, supra note 5, at 35b4.
62 See id.
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was one-half damages, but he might recover nothing at all. He could never
recover full damages. No matter the permutation (and irrespective of
whether proof was required as to which ox did the goring), where oxen
fought and one was injured by "horn," the owner of the tam paid only onehalf damages. The essence of the GOR was not the relationship of the
owners; if there was any doubt as to which of two or more oxen did the
goring, the plaintiff lacking proof recovered nothing. Yet, the principle
universally applied: where the causation was indirect, lower damages were
recoverable than when the damages were direct, because in an indirect
causal sequence there will be causes other than the fault of the tam gorer
that contribute to the loss.63
The GOR illustrates the importance of separating the element of fault
or the relationship between the owners from the element of causation and
the measure of damages. This principle is highly important in the FOM
where (as in the GOR) indirect causation is involved. Otherwise, the
proceeding degenerates into "give a dog a bad name and hang 'em," an
invitation to award speculative damages based upon supposed connections
between stock prices and remote acts by corporate executives. 64 This is
63See,

e.g., Anthony M. Sola & Lisa Mudd, "EggshellSkull Rule " Cases and
the Defense ofCulpable ConductforPlaintif's Smoking, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 8, 1999,
at 1.
4 Blurring the element of fault and the measure of damages results in
construing uncertainties against the wrongdoer, and the existence of uncertainty
invites speculation. See, e.g., Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F.
Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971):
[O]nce a plaintiffhas shown that the defendant has violated his substantive
rights and that he is entitled to damages, he ought not to be held to the high
level of proof required for other elements of this case. The somewhat
speculative nature of damages ought not to prevent a plaintiff from
recovering; where there is a substantial question, the facts must be
construed, within reasonable limits, against the tortfeasor.
Id. at 585. But see Green v. Occidental Petro., 541 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1976)
(Sneed, J., concurring). Under Daubertv. MerrellDow Pharmaceuticals,509 U.
S. 579 (1993), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,526 U.S. 137 (1999), damages
in fraud on the market securities cases must be proven by duplicable and testable
methodologies. See also Judge Brieant's opinion in In re Executive Telecard,979
F. Supp. 1021 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that event studies as to the contributing
causes are required). In one of the earliest securities class actions to be tried to
conclusion, Judge Brieant set aside part of the jury's damage award. Judge Brieant
did this despite the enormity ofthe defendants' lies, and even though the fraud was
undetected and unsuspected by the market. In one of the years involved, the market
price did not change commensurately with the magnitude of the lies. See Sirota v.

1999-20001

INDIRECT CAUSATION

particularly dangerous because of the natural inclination to fallaciously
reason post hoc, ergo propter hoc6' that the magnitude of the stock price
drop is a barometer of the significance of the securities "fraud." However,
in an indirect causal sequence it is to be expected that the effect of a cause
has been altered due to varying initial conditions along the steps in an
indirect causal chain.
Even though the element of fault is and should be considered separate
and distinct from the elements of causation and damages, conversely, the
more indirect the causation, the greater the proof needed to show intent.
That is because, over time, actions with indirect effects will result in
unforeseen consequences, in turn requiring modification of prior plans in
order to achieve the goals for which those plans were originally designed.6 6
VI. How THE GORING Ox RULE BECAME So IMPORTANT

Oxen were important in antiquity. They are frequently mentioned; they
were an important sacrificial animal, feeding many. Teams of oxen dragged
the spoils of triumphant Roman conquerors through rejoicing crowds, up
the winding road to the Roman forum. Ox teams dragged the bodies of
Egyptian notables in their outer coffins, preceded by singers. 67 Oxen were
numerous. 68 Whether oxen helped build the ancient architectural wonders
is unknown, but they were so significant in the popular imagination that the

Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566, 577 (2d Cir. 1982).
61 See Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F. 2d 410, 415-16 (7th
Cir. 1992) ("[P]eople who want damages have to prove them, using methodologies
that need not be intellectually sophisticated but must not insult the intelligence. ...

Post hoc, ergo propterhoc will not do.... .") (citations omitted); see also Holmes
v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 287 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("[A] proximate-cause requirement... has always been the practice
of common-law courts (and probably of all courts, under all legal systems) .... ").
6See DIETRICHDORNER, THELOGIC OF FAILURE, RECOGNIZING AND AVOIDING

ERROR IN COMPLEX SITUATIONS (Rita & Robert Kimber trans., 1997) (Complex
dynamic problems are only rationally tractable by reviewing, judging, and

modifying decisions against goals. Decisions must be updated as circumstances
change
from those extant at the time of the prior decision.).
6 See The Story ofSinuhe, supranote 3, at 68.
6' The Biblical law of booty discussed above reports the booty obtained from
the exterminated Midianities was 675,000 sheep, 72,000 oxen, 61,000 asses and
32,000 virgins. See Numbers 31:32-34. Even discounting for the supposed
tendency among the ancients for overstatement, we are to understand that the
amounts were substantial.
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first letter of the alphabet, the letter "A," evolved from the image of the
head of an ox. 9 The ox was one of the four apocalyptic beasts symbolizing
the four evangelists. According to legend, at Christmas it was the ox that
made room for Mary and Joseph.70
The GOR, on the other hand, was highly unusual. The ordinary rule
was that if an ox causes damage "in the field or vineyard of another," then
its owner was liable in full for the damage done, and "from the choicest of
his field and the choicest of his vineyard he shall pay."'" If the damage
occurred on the property of the gorer's owner or in the public domain, then
there was no liability on the part of its owner. The ordinary measure of
damages to property was "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth."'72 One

69See John Noble Wilford, Finds in EgyptDateAlphabet in EarlierEra,N.Y.

TIMEs, Nov. 14, 1999, at Al. The alphabet is thought to have originated among
Semitic people in Egypt, centuries before Joseph is believed to have arrived. The
alphabet imitated hieroglyphics and simplified them as sounds rather than words
and phrases. It was easier to learn associations between symbols and sounds than
between symbols and words orphrases. Common images were used as letters (e.g.,
a house was the image for the letter "B", the wavy water was the image for the
letter "vf '). See id.; see also E.A. WALLIs BUDGE, EGYPTIAN LANGUAGE, EASY
LEssoNs IN EGYPTIAN HIEROGLYPmCS 62 (1983); RICHARD A. FUAMAGE, THE
ALPHABET ABECEDARiuM 47-55 (1993); OSCAR OGG, THE 26 LETTERS (1971).
While many theories are offered regarding the letter "A" and the head of an ox, it
appears that the letter "A" represented the face and horns of an ox. It later came to
be inverted by rotation, through convenience, in writing the very common sound
"ah." The sound "ah," as in alpha, is the name or a sound contained in the word for
"ox" in several ancient Near-Eastern languages. It is also frequently a sound in the
name of "God" and related to the notion of dominance. But see Barry B. Powell,
ho Inventedthe A lphabet: The Semites orthe Greeks?,ARCHAEOLOGY ODYSSEY,
Premiere Issue 1998, at 45, 48 (Powell makes the radical suggestion that a Greek
discovered the alphabet.).
7 0See WATTS, supra
note 18, at 31.
7 1Exodus 22:5;
BAvA KAMMA, supra note 5.
72Regarding
the origins of"an eye for an eye," see Calum M. Carmichael, "An
Eye for an Eye, and a Tooth for a Tooth ": The History of a Formula, in LAW,
MoRALrrYAND RELIGION: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 27-28 (Alan Watson ed., Univ.
of Cal. at Berkeley, 1996). Mutilation of corpses is the historical basis of the rule.
For example, before the battle David and Goliath trade threats that the other's
corpse will be mutilated. As threatened, David cuts off the head of Goliath and
takes it to Jerusalem, leaving Goliath's body headless. See 1 Samuel 17:54. The
ancients were concerned about their and their loved ones' corpses to a degree
almost incomprehensible to us. The ultimate example is the mutilation of Osiris'
corpse by Seth in the story of Horace, the centerpiece of Egyptian mythology. Like
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pays the monetary value73 of the damage done, in this case, by one's ox. By
this measure, if one's ox gored the ox of another, one would expect that the
owner of the gorer would be required to pay "an ox for an ox." Indeed, "an
ox for an ox" is the measure of damages for a muad gorer. But "an ox for
an ox" was not the general rule where one's ox gored another's ox; it was
the exception. The general rule was one-half damages for a tam. Under
most circumstances, a person who suffered damage to his property would
recover either full damages or no damages at all (depending upon whether
a cause of action was recognized and the plaintiffbrought proof). But in the

Moses's mother, Isis hid the infant Horus frotm Seth in the reeds of the Nile. The
famous "Turn the other cheek" ofMatthew 5:38-39 is a conservative limitation on
"an eye for an eye," holding that tit-for-tat damages were not recoverable for mere
insults without actual physical damage. In this case the hit is figurative, a "slap in
the face." See Carmichael, supra,at 27-28 (attributing this insight to his teacher
David Daube). Cf BAVA KAMMA 8:6; PINHAS KEHATI 120-22 (1994) ("Rambam
writes: 'There are many types of blows entailing shame, and a little pain, but no
real injury."' The payments are in the nature of fines for shame and pain, whether
or not there was healing or loss of time.). A slap on the cheek with the palm of
one's hand would likely cause greater physical injury than a slap on the cheek with
the back of the hand. But, a slap with the back of the hand was considered
extremely humiliating. Damages were based, not on any actual injury, but upon the
insult. Hence, the fine for a slap with the back of the hand was double the fine for
a slap in the face with the palm of one's hand. The less celebrated line in Matthew
5:40, which follows "turn the other cheek," is that if you are asked (sued) for the
shirt off your back, give your coat as well. This refers to the humiliation inflicted
where one exposes the nakedness of another. See Carmichael, supra, at 27-28;
BAVA KAMMA, supra note 5, at 8:6 (providing that one who exposes to a greater
degree the nakedness of another, who has already exposed his own nakedness to
a lesser degree, is liable for a fine). Again the phrase is proverbial, "to lose the shirt
off your back." Like the phrase "turn the other cheek" that precedes it, the phrase
"lose the shirt off your back" is deeply ironic because descamisados are most
unlikey to be so fortunate as to own a coat.It raises the specter of fraud that one so
poor as to lose his shirt would nonetheless still own a coat.See alsoMAIMONIDES,
MISHNEH ToRAH 230 (Philip Birnbaum ed., 1967) (regarding insults: "Although
the person who verbally insults people is exempt from paying .... the ancient
sages declared: 'Anyone who puts a worthy Jew to shame in public has no share
in the world to come.' "). Note also the differentpaths of the English andAmerican
laws of libel.
3 See Bernard S. Jackson, The Problem ofExodus 21:22-5 (us Talionis),
Essays in Jewish and ComparativeLegal History, in STUDIES IN JUDAISM, supra
note 11, at 82 ("The Rabbis, as is well known, interpreted the ius talionis as
monetary compensation.").
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case of the tam-gorer, full damages are never available. The owner of the
victim of the tam-gorer never received more than one-half damages. 74
Because the GOR was at once well-established 7 and unusual, it gave
rise to a great debate among the Talmudic Rabbis regarding the difference
between the rule of one-half damages for injury caused by "horn" and the
normal, general rule of full (or no damages depending on location) for
injury caused in ways other than by "horn." The archetypal injury other
than by "horn" was by "foot" or by "tooth." Damages for injury by "foot"
or by "tooth" occurring on the land of the injured party were fully
recoverable; otherwise no damages were recoverable. 76 But how to
reconcile these two different rules? If injury by "horn" was so serious that
"half' damages were awarded in a situation were no damages would be
awarded for injury by "tooth" or by "foot," then why should only "half'
damages be awarded for injury by "horn" in a situation when full damages
would be awarded for injury by "foot" or by "tooth"? 77 Where injury by the
lesser evil ("foot" or "tooth") produces full damages, should not a fortiori
full damages be awarded where the injury is by the greater evil ("horn")? 78
The modem student of law and economics might suggest that the
obligation to pay is perhaps related to the comparative cost to the parties
to prevent the loss. But the solution in the GOR is more sophisticated. The
GOR, unlike the ordinary rule of "foot" and "tooth," was not a rule of

74

See BAVA KAMMA, supra note 5, at 24b3-26a4.
5 Reuven Yaron claims that the GOR originates from "a common fount,
Oriental Legal practice," but he bases his assertion on the slender reed found in the
Laws of Eshnuna. See Yaron, supra note 13, at 52. Yaron may well be right,
though. The Code of Hammurabi and the Laws of Eshnunna were only discovered
in this
century and future discoveries may confirm his hypothesis.
76 See
BAVA KAMMA, supra note 5, at 16al & n.12, 26al.
77 See id. at 24b3.
7 The Talmud answers,
"No." See id.at 26b3. It is sufficient for the application
argument a fortiori that, if "half" damages are awarded in the lenient case, then
"half" damages should be awarded in the stringent case. The argument a fortiori
does not contend that the damages should be greater than in the underlying case
argued from. Thus, if damage by "horn" occurring on the property of the owner of
the gorer results in one-half damages, then a fortiori where damage occurs on the
property of the victim at least one-half damages should be awarded. But it carries
the argument a fortiori too far to contend that greater damages should be awarded.
Logical arguments should only be carried so far as is sufficient to give them
meaning. The argument "it is sufficient' is a limitation upon application of the
argument a fortiori. See generally regarding ancient rhetorical arguments, DAUBE,
RabbinicMethods, in WORKS OF DAvID DAUBE, supranote 5, at 333.
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deterrence, of loss prevention through the exercise of due care.79 A tam
injury by "horn" was considered a freak, abnormal, unpreventable accident,
for which liability existed, but not through fault, and damages were limited.
Injury by "horn" meant any act of damage that an animal does with
destructive intent and which is unusual for animals of that species (and by
inference was unpreventable by the exercise of reasonable care). Injury by
"foot" or by "tooth" meant damage that an animal does in the course of
normal movement, such as in eating, walking, and scratching (which could
be prevented by the exercise of reasonable care).8" Damage by "horn" was
damage as to which the costs of prevention to either or both parties was
unwarranted as a matter of risks and rewards.
Injury due to goring by "horn" was considered abnormal.8 Injury by
"foot" or by "tooth" was considered normal.8" Thus, injury literally caused
by the feet or teeth of an ox could, nevertheless, be considered by "horn"
if it was caused abnormally like an injury by "horn." Conversely, only
rarely could an abnormal injury be deemed normal. For example, by
happenstance a person falling out of a window landed on the horn of an ox
walking in the street below. In such case the injury, even though literally
being caused by horn, would be considered to have been caused by "foot"
or by "tooth." 3
79 See

DAUBE, The Civil Law of the Mishnah, in WORKS OF DAVID DAUBE,
supra note 5, at 276; cf.Exodus 22:14 and BAVA MFTziA 8:1-3 (Liability of one
who borrows a cow depends on whether he borrbwed its owner with it. It was
customary to borrow the ownerwith his cow.). In distant times owners would travel
with their cargo, but when that practice became rare, the rule remained that their
consent was required to jettison their goods. Since their consent could not be
obtained in time, it was implied that they had consented in advance to the master
using his good judgment. See Ralli v. Troop, 157 U.S. 386 (1895). Similarly,
combatants who were not actually present and did not participate inthe battle could
still8recover a portion of the spoils. See generally JACKSON, supra note 11.
oSee Glossary definitions, BAVA KAMMA, supra note 5.
81 See id. at 18a3 n.27 ("The key feature of [tam horn] is that the animal has
done something that is abnormal for itto do. Thus, all such instances are called...
abnormal."). Note, however, that it is normal for oxen, and indeed all homed
animals, to butt with their horns. It is abnormal for an ox to cause the death of
another ox by its hom. An ox can take a great deal of abuse about the homs, head,
neck and shoulders. An injury by horn to the vulnerable gut is abnormal. See Letter
from Drew Conroy, supranote 30, at 1, 3.
See Letter from Drew Conroy, supra note 30.
83
BAVAKAMMA, supra note 5; see also Judge Calabresi's concurring opinion
in Moore v. PaineWebber, Inc., 189 F.3d 165, 173 (2d Cir. 1999).
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Indirect damages were also sometimes referred to as having been
caused by one's "arrows." Illustratively, a person who lights a fire is said
to have "shot his arrow." He has "[set a] force in motion. But he is not
liable for what follows due to the intervention of subsequent, unrelated
factors."" In that case his "arrows have ceased." s Similarly, a cause could
start out normally, for example by "foot," but be extended in an abnormal
or normal way. The word "tzroros" literally means "pebbles" or "chips"
and describes damage caused indirectly by the actor through something it
propels.8" For example, an ox steps on a vase and the chips of the vase fly
out and cause some yet further, more remote damage. Tzroros that are
abnormal (as most are) result in "half" damages.87 Thus, if a dog robs a hot
cake from the cooking fire of another and lays down to eat it on a haystack
that is ignited by coals attached to the cake, the dog's owner pays the full
value of the cake "from the choicest" of his property and one-half the value
of the haystack "from the body of" the dog.88 Moreover, for even more
attenuated damages, the possibility exists that one-quarter, one-eighth, and
so forth damages may be the measure.8 9
The GOR holds that the more indirect and attenuated the causation, the
lesser the damages. However, rather than postulating decreasing fractions
as the causal chain lengthens, as a practical matter remote damages may be
deemed too speculative.9 0 Underlying both the concepts of declining
recovery and an absolute cutoff is the notion that there are correlations
between direct causation and the presence of culpable conduct and between
indirect causation and the absence of culpable conduct. 91 In effect, we are
84

BAVA KAMMA, supranote 5, at 23al.
Id.Sinuhe, the Egyptian prototype of David, was a bowman who vanquished
the opposing champion with an arrow to his neck. See The Story ofSinuhe, supra
note 3, at 64. In the story of David and Goliath, however, the indirectness of
causation is much greater because Goliath was felled by a mere river pebble from
a sling, not a weapon of war. The message is clear. As David said would happen,
the Lord delivered up Goliath rather than David being the major cause of his death.
See 861 Samuel 17:46.
See BAVA KAMMA, Glossary "tzroros," supra note 5.
87 See id. at 17h3, 18a2.
88 See id. at 18a2, 21b2.
89See id. at 19al-19a2 ("thae inquiry
stands unresolved").
' As Justice Antonin Scalia put it, "Life is too short to pursue every human act
to its most remote consequences; 'for want of a nail, a kingdom was lost' is a
commentary on fate, not the statement of a major cause of action against a
blacksmith." Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 287
(1992) (Scalia, J., concurring). See also infra note 154.
9'See DAUBE, Direct and IndirectCausation,supranote 28, at 246, 255.
85
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separating out the planned or the proximately caused from the fortuitous
and difficult to control or bring about.
VII. "FROM THE BODY OF," CORPORATE INDEMNIFICATION

The limitation on damages measured by the value, or one-half the
value, of the gorer is expressed as "to pay from the body of" the gorer.
Liability to pay full value for an extremely valuable ox might be more than
the owner of the gorer could bear.92 Therefore, rather than being threatened
with being sold himself,93 he would plead "take the damages from the body
of" (in this case his goring ox). In this way his investment in the venture
was, in effect, incorporated, and he could lose no more than his investment
(Talmud) or one-half thereof (Exodus).
Surrendering one's animal as a limitation on financial liability is
known as noxal surrender. 94 It makes, however, for a backwards way of
viewing damages-not from the ordinary perspective of the value of the
plaintiff's loss, but rather from the value of the defendant's property that
was not lost. The expression that the plaintiffmay have recovery "from the
best" of the defendant's property also focuses on the defendant's property
that, ironically, is in excellent condition, rather than on the value of the
plaintiff's property before its injury.
Where an ox known by its owner to gore people, gores and kills a
person, the penalty in Exodus is death or, in lieu thereof, a suitable fine.95
Where the monetary alternative to death is a suitable fine, logic focuses on
what the owner of the surviving ox would be willing to pay to avoid being
sold into slavery himself. But the value of the defendant's life has nothing

92The

Talmudic example is "if an ox worth 100 zuz gored an ox worth 200

zuz." See BAVA KAMMA, supra note 5, at 3:9 n.7. In Mishnaic times a woman's
dress allowance for a year, excluding shoes, was 50 zuz. Purportedly, a kid could
be bought for two zuz. See PINHAS KEHATI, Mishnah, Vol. 1, supranote 72, at 207.
9' See Lindgren, supra note 3, at 207 ("A common ancient solution for the
inability to pay high fines was slavery or servitude.... .").Because of the severity
of the consequences, many of those who joined David's ragtag band of fugitives
from Saul were debtors. See 1 Samuel 22:2. Solving the predicament of the debtor
class of Athens was the crowning achievement of Solon, the greatest Greek lawgiver. See PLUTARCH, THE LivEs OF THE NOBLE GREEKs AND ROMANs (1631).
94 See THE OXFORD ENGLAND DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). From Latin a "noxa"
is a hurt or damage. By surrendering the object that did the injury, under this
concept its owner is absolved. See id.
95
See Exodus 21:29-30.
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to do with the value of the plaintiff's loss of his or her life. 6 Thus, where
a muad killed a person, the value of the victim was a limitation on
damages, but so was the value of the owner of the gorer a limitation where
it was less.
In our system as in the GOR, damages are paid "from the body of" the
enterprise, which is a limitation on damages. The individual defendants,
typically the managing officers of the corporate defendant, say, as in
Biblical times, take the damages "from the body of," in this case, the
corporation. They are broadly entitled to indemnification by the corporation, except for egregious conduct of a level akin to the relatively strict
Biblical standard of the muad ox that was habitually vicious to other
oxen.97 The muad is a threat to the joint enterprise. As long as the officer
is tam vis-a-vis the enterprise, he is entitled to indemnification. Conduct so
inimical to the interests of the enterprise that the malefactor should not be
indemnified by the enterprise is rare. In ordinary securities fraud litigation,
corporate indemnification is routine and expected. 9 Although the corporate
96 See

Lindgren, supranote 3, at 152-53. "Ancient law systems are marked by
the reduction of people to their prices to a degree that looks almost
incomprehensible to us." Id. at 206. "Thedifferences within basic classes are often
huge." Id. at 152.
' The notion of liability based on being "warned" is found in the recent SEC
proceedings against Bear, Stearns Securities Corp. Bear, Steams was not alleged
to have done anything directly wrong. Instead, it was allegedly warned that two
firms it cleared for, A.L. Baron and Sterling Foster, were habitual gorers. See In re
Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp., Securities Act Release No. 7718, Exchange Act Release
No. 41,707, 70 S.E.C. Docket 537 (Aug. 5, 1999).
9' See generally
Waltuch v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 88 F.3d 87 (2d Cir.
1996) (requiring mandatory indemnification under § 145 of Delaware General
Corporation Law where the action settled without contribution by the officer and
even though his conduct was allegedly egregiously dishonest, on the basis that he
had achieved success "on the merits or otherwise"); JOSEPH WARREN BISHOP, JR.,
THE LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS, INDEMNIICATION AND
INSURANCE (1992); WiLLIM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LABILrrY OF
CORPORATE OFFICERS ANDDIRECTORS (1993); JOHNF. OLSON& JOSIAH O. HATCH
I, DRECTORANDOCER LABiLrry: INDEmEmCATIONAND INSURANCE (1997);

Gandolfo V. DiBlasi et al., Recent Developments in Director and Officer
Indemnificationandlnsurance,1053 PRAC. L. INsT./CoRP. 263 (1998); E.Norman
Veasey et al., DelawareSupportsDirectorswith a Three-LeggedStool ofLimited
Liability, Indemnification, and Insurance, 42 Bus. LAW. 399 (1987). In the
landmark Apple Computer securities litigation corporate indemnification insurance
was afforded for directors and officers who had been found liable for securities
fraud and the charge to the jury had been close to an instruction of intentional
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managers are themselves sued, due to mechanisms of indemnification the
damages in a very real sense, as in the case of the GOR, are paid out of the
enterprise and hence by the owners of the enterprise. 99
There is an inherent conflict recognized by some courts between
persons who bought securities and have since sold them, persons who
bought securities and who still own them, and securities holders who fall
outside the group of persons potentially entitled to recover damages and
only stand to lose if the corporation pays damages. 100 Obviously, there are
conflicting claims to the corporation's assets between these three groups.
As in the case of the owner of the tam gorer, the solution is that some
portion of the plaintiffs loss is paid "from the-body of" the corporation
(with regard being had for the ownership interests in the venture of those
not eligible to recover damages and those who are eligible to recover
damages but still have an investment in the entity that pays the damages).
Thus, the existence of conflicting claims to the corporate assets between
securities purchasers, ins-and-outs, and holders as of various time periods
is a de facto limitation on the plaintiff's recovery. Were the plaintiff to
press the case to the point that the defendant corporation declared
10 1
bankruptcy, the plaintiff would receive comparatively little.
fraud. See In re Apple Computer See. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,252
(N.D. Cal. 1991); see also Raychem Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co., 853 F. Supp. 1170,
1177 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Steinbergv. Pargas, Inc., Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,979
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); Kapoorv. FujisawaPharm. Co., No. C.A. 93C-06-50, 1994 WL
233947, at *7-8 (Del. Super. Ct. May 10, 1994), af'd,655 A.2d 307 (Del. Super.
Ct 1995). But see Eichenholtz v. Brennan, 52 F.3d 478, 484-85 (3d Cir. 1995)
(ruling that indemnity claims between defendants based on proportionate fault or
underwriter indemnification agreements are notpermitted as againstpublic policy);
Ridder v. Cityfed Fin. Corp., 47 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that the right to
advancement of defense expenses is distinct from the right of indemnity and does
not depend on the merits of the underlying claim).
' Although the directors and officers direct the activities of the corporation, it
is the corporation that acts. People take note of their actions because they
ostensibly act under the aegis of the corporation in their capacities as corporate
directors and officers.
" See In re Clearly Canadian Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 90,664
(N.D. Cal. 1999); In re Seagate H Tech. See. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 1341, 1362-64
(N. D. Cal. 1994). Justice White, concurring in part and dissenting in part in Basic,
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 262 (1988), was concerned that large judgments
would result from the FOM" 'payable in the last analysis by innocent investors, for
the benefit of speculators and their lawyers."' Basic, 485 U.S. at 262 (White, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
101 See Robert J. Stark, Reexamining the Subordination of Investor Fraud
Claims in Bankruptcy: A CriticalStudy of In Re Granite Partners, L.P., 72 AM.
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VIII. FRAUD ON THE MARKET

The fraud on the market theory ("FOM") is an ex ante presumption of
how the major securities markets work. It purports to explain the paradox
that people who have no direct personal contact with a securities fraud may
nonetheless be indirectly harmed by that fraud. In effect, the market is the
ox, or agent, of the victim communicating with the victim in the message
of the market price. The FOM postulates that the price set by a large
competitive market reflects all of the information material to deciding
whether or not to invest.102 By the criterion of the extant information
regarding a given company, the market price of its securities best reflects
the value of the security; there is no other or better gauge of its value.
Hence, a class of the most ignorant investors-those who only knew the
price-may be certified as having common issues under Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 3 The FOM avoids the need for, and
unique issues presented in, ex post analyses of how the investors were
directly injured by the fraud.
FOM is used in actions brought under Securities and Exchange
Commission Rule 10(b)-5,11 promulgated under section 10(b) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.15 Typically, the action involves a
class of purchasers of stock in the open market who have seen their shares
plummet in value and claim they overpaid for their stock. Rule 10(b)-5, as
interpreted by the courts, derives in significant part from the common law
causes of action for misrepresentation and deceit.10 6
The common law cause of action for fraud or misrepresentation itself
derives historically from the cause of action for deceit.107 "Deceit is one of
the more logically intricate torts. The plaintiff's own actions cause the
BANKR. L. J. 497 (1998).
02 See Daniel R. Fischel, Use ofModern
FinanceTheory in SecuritiesFraud
Cases Involving Actively TradedSecurities, 38 Bus. LAW. 1 (1982); Jonathan R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of
Fraud-on-the-MarketTheory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1059 (1990).
103 See FED. R.Cr. P. 23.
104 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
105 Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. 78j (1994). See
supra note 7.
06See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224,253 (1988) (White, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
107 See id.; WiLtiAM L. PROSsER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 685, 699
(4th ed. 1971).
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plaintiff's injury. Recovery for self-inflicted injury [the decision to invest]
is possible because the plaintiff alleges that his actions were in response to
the defendant's false statement." ' In the cause of action for deceit
"[r]eliance provides the requisite causal connection between a defendant's
misrepresentation and aplaintiff's injury."'" Butbecause reliance typically
occurred in face-to-face transactions, the cause of action for deceit "has
been colored to a considerable extent by the ethics of bargaining between
distrustful adversaries." ' 10
On the other hand, under the FOM, aplaintiff's loss arises from buying
and selling shares in an impersonal marketplace;'' that is, a market so large
that buyers and sellers are anonymous and their motives remain hidden.
Since the identity and motives of buyers and sellers are not known, the
investor does not know why the person on the other side of the transaction
is buying or selling. Moreover, under the FOM the plaintiff need never
have read, seen, heard or even known of an item of information in order for
it to have affected him. The market acted as an intermediary. The market
performs in substantial part, if not entirely, the valuation process performed
by the investor in a face-to-face transaction."' "The market is acting as the
unpaid agent of the [uninformed] investor, informing him that given all the
information available to it, the value of the stock is worth the market
price."1' 3 Under the FOM "the market is interposed between""t1 4 the buyer
and the source of information. Thus, under the FOM the plaintiff need not
be directly harmed by the defendant. Rather, according to the theory, the
0'Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos,

Frauds,Markets, andFraud-on-the-Market:
The TorturedTransitionofJustifiableReliancefromDeceit to SecuritiesFraud,49
U. MfAw L. REv. 671, 711 (1995).
'09 Basic, 485 U.S. at 243.
110 Id. at 244 n.21 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON
TiE LAW OF TORTs 726 (5th ed. 1984)).
"' See id.at 245, 247, 248, 255. 1 mention the element of market efficiencythat the market must be impersonal-mindful that a person is always considered
muad, whether acting inadvertently or intentionally, whether awake or asleep. See
BAVA KAMMA, supra note 5, at 2:6. This does not mean, however, that a large
group of people, a crowd for example, are muad, i.e., that the crowd, to the extent
it acts as a unit, acts with purposefulness, i.e., scienter. I am suggesting below that
the impersonal workings of so large a crowd as is necessary to make a market
efficient are more like the workings of an ox than an individual person.
"2 See In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 142 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (quoted in
Basic, 485 U.S. at 244).
"13 Basic, 485 U.S. at 244 (quotingLTV,88 F.R.D. at 143).
114
Id.
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market absorbed any material misrepresentation. It was discounted in the
share price through informed investors voting with their pocketbooks, and
its impact was thereby reflected quantitatively in the price of the security.
According to the theory, one would assume ex ante that a material
misrepresentation should in some measure skew the share price causing the
plaintiff to overpay for the securities."n
The FOM waters down116 the standard for pleading and proof"7 by
presuming the requirement at common law that the plaintiff have relied
upon the defendant's misrepresentation or omission. Under the FOM the
investor can simply join the crowd and uncritically accept the market price
as the conventional wisdom and best judgment of the crowd as to the value
of the security being purchased. The investor may abdicate to the market
the responsibility to critically assess the information that enters the market
place. Under the FOM, the investor is presumed ex ante to be justified in
relying upon the market price to reflect a rational consensus of the value of
securities (even though, of course, the market price may instead reflect
"popular delusions and the madness of crowds""').
While far from perfect, the ex ante presumption in the FOM regarding
the normal conduct of investors and markets may be preferable to the
practice that preceded it. Before the FOM, unsophisticated purchasers of
a few hundred shares of stock or less would sometimes testify (seemingly
falsely) ex post that they invested based upon relatively obscure portions
of dull, lengthy and obscure documents that they recalled reading and
relying upon before they made their investment." 9 By the criterion of
Of course, the opposite claim can be made, that one sold too cheaply.
However, a seller claim is more common under Meinhardv. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545
(N.Y.
1928), corporate law principles than under Rule 10(b)-5.
116
Justice White, concurring in part and dissenting in part in Basic, claims the
FOM "eviscerates" the reliance requirement. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 258.
7 Although called "fraud," a claim of securities
fraud need only be proven by
the negligence standard of a preponderance of the evidence, not the clear and
convincing standard of common law fraud. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston,
459 U.S. 375, 387-88 (1983).
11

18

CHARLEs MACKAY, EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR DELUSIONS AND THE MAD-

(1841); see also Paul Krugman, Reckonings:A Leap in the Dark,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 5, 2000, at A21.
""Years ago I witnessed a proverbial little old lady, who had purchased a small
amount of shares, testify at trial that she had done so based upon a particular
contingent liability disclosure footnote in the company's financial statements
audited by the defendant accountant See generallyHomer Kripke, The Myth ofthe
Informed Layman, 28 Bus. LAW. 631 (1973). More commonly at that time
NESS OF CROWDS
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truthful testimony at least, the catechism of the FOM seems better in most
cases than the post hoc explanations offered before.
IX. FRAUD ON THE MARKET AS A LIMITATION ON DAMAGES

Based upon the teaching of the GOR, the more indirect the causation,
the lesser the recoverable damages. Thus, the indirectness of causation in
FOM open market securities litigation should similarly result in the
limiting of the recoverable damages. And indeed, the investor's total loss
is not recoverable. In a face-to-face transaction involving direct causation,
the investor may recover greater damages, such as disgorgement, rescission, restitution, benefit of the bargain or even (where provable) consequential damages. In the FOM, the measure of damages is "actual" or
"out-of- pocket" damages 20 due to the fraud (in contradistinction to other
causes), limited by the "bounce back" provisions of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"). 21
The terms "actual" and "out-of-pocket," used in the FOM, are
misnomers if they suggest full damages. Underlying the limitation of
damages in the FOM is the notion that the investor assumes, and should not
be compensated for, the investment risk inherent in the purchase of
securities. Where the defendant sells shares to the plaintiff, greater
damages are recoverable than in the case of the FOM where the plaintiff
bought shares in the open market.
The very existence of a fund of "ill-gotten gain" may be ample
justification for a rule of damages which shifts more of a plaintiff's
investment risk to the defendant. Hence, plaintiffs might be treated
differently in such a case depending upon whether or not they dealt with
the defendant. "

investors would claim they relied on prominentportions of documents, such as the
proverbial "bottom line" of earnings per share and were not responsible for not
reading other more obscure portions. They can no longer recover. Under the FOM
the market is ex ante presumed to read, digest and discount all material information
even if salted away in dull disclosure documents fied with the SEC that almost no
one likes to, and few do, read.
120 See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972);
Green v. Occidental Petro. Corp., 541 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1976); supra note 64.
121 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (1997);
see also Jonathan C. Dickey & Marsha Kramer Mayer, Effect on Rule 10b-5
Damagesofthe 1995PrivateSecuritiesLitigationReformAct: A Forward-Looking
Assessment, 51 Bus. LAW. 1203 (1995).

" See In re Clearly Canadian Sec. Litig., Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 90,664
(N.D. Cal. 1999).
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The securities laws are not intended to be "a scheme of investor's
insurance."'" One investor's loss is another investor's gain. Judge Walker
of the Northern District of California, a frequent critic of securities
litigation, put the conundrum as follows:
[T]he penalty imposed is not rationally related to the socialharm inflicted.
For every dollar taken from an "injured' investor that same dollar is put
in another innocent investor's pocket: every dollar lost by an investor who
pays an inflated price for a stock is gained by the investor who sold at the
inflated price. The failure to incorporate this fact into the damage analysis
results in a systematic over estimation ofthe social harm inflicted. Indeed,
the out of pocket damage rule is not a damage rule at all. It is a wealth
transfer formula whose impact is punitive in nature. 124
This is the same conundrum that Judge Cardozo raised in the oftenquoted passage from the grandfather case, UltramaresCorp. v. Touche.'"
If liability existed that exposed "in an indeterminate amount, for an
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class ... . [t]he hazards of a
business conducted on these terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt
whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty that exposes to
these consequences.' 2 6 In Ultramares,Judge Cardozo was concerned about
an extreme disproportionality between the level of the defendant's culpable
conduct and its consequences in damages chargeable to that defendant. 27
This problem can be dealt with through apportionment of damages. The
FOM theory may result in "strict liability, but the degree of the wrong28
doer's exposure is limited to the precise impact of the challenged'

" Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,252 (1988) (White, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (quoting Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 469 n.5 (5th
Cir. 1981) (en bane)).
Inre Clearly Canadian,Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 90,664.
'z Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
126id.
at 444.
127 See id. at 448.
128 Michael J. Kaufman, The Uniform Rule of Liability Under the Federal
SecuritiesLaws: The Judicial Creation ofa Comprehensive Scheme ofInvestor
Insurance,63 TEMP. L. REV. 61, 62, 115 (1990). "The civil liability provisions of
the federal securities laws reflectthe competing desires to protect investors without
creating in terrorumeffects on legitimate commerce." Id. at 61. Strict liability, but
damages limited to the price-value disparities created by the defendant's conduct,
"is ultimately apmdentjudicial compromisebetween the competing congressional
policy goals of investor protection and fairness to defendants." Id. at 115; see also
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conduct by the defendant on the price. Recoverable damages are the
portion, if any, that a company's stock price was increased or decreased by
the defendant's wrong, as opposed to other causes confounding the price.
In practice, especially where the level of the defendant's culpable conduct
is low (recklessness for example), the damages recoverable by the plaintiff
are usually a fraction of the investor's total loss, on the theory that the
plaintiff's loss was due in large part to other non-tortious confounding
causes. 29 Because sensitive initial conditions along the causal chain, not
the fault of the defendant, contribute to and cause the result, there will often
be other non-tortious causes that contribute to the result where the injury
is caused indirectly.
Particularly in a case where the corporate officers' conduct may have
been symptomatic of aggressive and competitive conduct by corporate
managers that usually benefits the corporation and most of its shareholders,
the plaintiffs' recoverable losses should be, and in practice usually are,
pared down. Corporations and their owners, particularly long-term owners,
may prefer that the corporation employ more aggressive and competitive
managers. The corporation may risk incurring liability for the "goring" of
some investors' property, rather than employ less striving, more compliant
managers. The notion is that it is better to risk litigation than have milk

Theresa A. Gabaldon, Causation,Courts,and Congress:A Study ofContradiction
in the FederalSecuritiesLaws, 31 B.C. L. REv. 1027 (1990); Andrew L. Merritt,
A ConsistentModel ofLoss Causationin Securities FraudLitigation:Suiting the
Remedy to the Wrong, 66 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1988) ("[A] majority of courts have
restricted a defrauded purchaser's recovery... to the difference between the price
paid for the security and the value of the. security at the time of the initial
transaction, even when subsequent economic forces deprive the plaintiff of the
entire value of the security.") (The author is critical of this rule.); Simmonds et al.,
supra note 7.
,29 SeeIn re Executive Telecard, 979 F. Supp. 1021 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting
that the expert's analysis failed to consider the effect on stock price of a proposed
spin off of divisions despite his acknowledgement that there were significant
shareholder concerns about the wisdom of the proposed spin off.); see also In re
Oracle Sec. Litig., 829 F. Supp. 1176 (N.D. Cal. 1993); Shiller & Schmidt, Inc. v.
Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410, 415-16 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating, in the antitrust
context, that an analysis that fails to separate damages due to unlawful conduct
from those resulting from lawful competition "insults the intelligence." "Post hoe,
ergo propter hoc will not do. . . ."); United States Football League v. National
Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1378-79 (2d Cir. 1988); In re Aluminum
Phosphate Antitrust Litig., 893 F. Supp. 1497, 1501-04 (D. Kan. 1995); Powers v.
British Vita, 57 F.3d 176, 189 (2d Cir. 1995).
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toast managers. Since damages are paid"from the body" ofthe corporation,
the true litmus test is whether corporate managers on whose behalf
substantial damages are paid in securities fraud litigation should be
discharged from their employment for their alleged "fraudulent' conduct.
The answer seems obvious. Even if the factual allegations were true, many
of those sued in securities fraud class actions have been senior corporate
executives from some of America's most successful companies. 3 ' Judging
from the prices of the securities over the long haul of some of the
corporations sued in securities litigation, their shareholders would almost
certainly not have been better off if other corporate managers had been at
the helm.
Indeed, in the PSLRA of 1995,11' Congress recognized the calculation
of damages is not merely the plaintiff's total loss. Congress noted there
often are substantial disagreements among the parties regarding the amount
of potentially recoverable damages.' One section of the PSLRA provides
that the settling parties in a securities class action are required to provide
the class members with a statement of the parties' disagreements pertaining
to the average amount of damages per share that would be recoverable if
the plaintiffs prevailed. 3 Similarly, § 78u-4(b)(4) explicitly provides that
30

See, e.g., In re Sun Microsystems, 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18740 (N.D. Cal.
1990). Sun Microsystems had a loss for the fourth quarter of 1989. Its stock
dropped from a high in the class period of $22.75 to $13.00. Based on prices at the
end of 1999, class members, provided they had not sold their shares, have enjoyed
a return of between roughly 50 to 80 times the price they paid for their shares.
"3Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (1999).
132 See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N.
730.
133 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(7)(B)(ii) (1999); see also Richard Bemporad, A
Practitioner'sGuide to the SettlementNotice Provisionsofthe PSLRA, 58 COMM.
ON CORP. CouNs. NEWS L., Sept. 1999, at 10. Similarly, § 78u-4(b)(4) of the
Private Securities Litigation -Reform Act ("PSLRA") requires that the plaintiff
prove loss causation. The first court of appeals to endorse the FOM thought "that
the jury will be able to trace a graph delineating the actual value of the stock
throughout the class period. When compared with a comparable graph of the price
the stock sold at, the determination of damage will be a mechanical task for each
class member." Blackiev. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891,909 n.25 (9th Cir. 1975). A more
recent analysis states that "[t]he difficulty in performing an accurate 'out ofpocket'
damage calculation is, in and of itself, cause to question the rationality of the 'out
of pocket' measure of damages in open market cases." In re Clearly Canadian See.
Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 90,664 (N.D. Cal. 1999). Under current standards
it is necessary to create multiple event studies for the various contributing causes
and measure andplotthe coefficient ofresponsiveness, that is, the sensitivity of the
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the plaintiff must prove loss causation. In addition, under § 78u-4(f)(3)(ii)
an apportionment of percentages of fault is required "of all persons who
1 34
caused or contributed to the loss incurred by the plaintiff."
X. DISPROPORTIONALITY OF CAUSES

AND EFFECTS DUE TO INITAL CONDITIONS

The FOM is based upon the efficient market hypothesis, an economic
theory that gained popularity in the 1960s and 1970s.' 35 Under this theory,
securities prices in a large, efficient market should approximate the
underlying fundamental value of the investment. 136 Using conventional
statistics, namely the bell-shaped curve, stock price 37 changes are plotted
allowing for market and industry effects. By convention, price movements
more than two standard deviations from the norm are considered
"abnormal," and therefore are statistically significant. 31 In trade jargon,
significant stock price drops are termed "statistically significant excess
negative abnormal returns.' 39 Price movements of less than two standard
deviations" are assumed due (since it cannot be ruled out statistically) to
"noise" or ordinary volatility. Where a price change exceeds the threshold
of two standard deviations, the entire price change is used in the measurement of damages, not just the amount by which the price drop exceeds the
threshold of normal volatility or "noise."' 4 Under the theory, an excess
company's stockprice to various causes. See Simmonds et al., supranote 7, at 163.
134 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(f)(3)(ii) (1999).
,3 ,"[T]he semi-strong version ofthe EfficientMarket Hypothesis ... states that
stock prices in an actively traded security reflect all publicly available information
and respond quickly to new information .... " DAviD TABAK & FREDERICK C.
DUNBAR, MATERIALITY AND

MAGNITUDE: EVENT STUDIES IN THE COURTROOM

3

(National Econ. Research Assoc. Working Paper No. 34, 1999) (citing RICHARD
A.BREALEY& STEWART C. MYERS, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE FINANCE 306

(1995)).

13 6 See id.

137 The correct

terminology, of course, is not "price" but "return." There is no
difference for companies that do not pay dividends. A return is merely the price
adjusted for dividends and stock splits. See PHILIP L. COOLEY, BUSINESS
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 561 (3d ed. 1994).
"'38 For a primer on basic conventional methodology, see generally TABAK &
DUNBAR, supranote 135.
'39 Id. at4.
" See id. This represents a roughly 95% confidence interval. The probability
is 19 to 1 that the price change was not due to mere volatility.
'4'

See id. at 15-20.
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negative abnormal return should be accompanied by "news"142
which had
a material impact' upon the fundamenftals of the company. According to
this methodology, after a large price drop pundits scurry about to ascribe
the cause(s) on the assumption that there must be some significant cause
where there seems to be an abnormal effect on prices.
Consistent with the Biblical association of damages by "horn" with
damages that are abnormal, cases brought under the FOM have often been
characterized chiefly by an abnormal stock price drop."4 Such stock price

The term "news" is jargon for the announcement of some item of
information previously unknown by the market. In the real world, news is what
appears in newspapers or in press releases, which may or may not have been
previously disclosed publicly. Unlike in the world of theoretical efficiency, even
old news previously disclosed can move prices. See Susan Pulliam, Internet
InvestorsStartto RegardPressReleases on NewProductsas Reasonto SendStock
Soaring,WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 1999, at Cl (writing that old news or unimportant
news announced in press releases drives up stock prices).
" The theory supports the understanding that price changes within the band of
two standard deviations might equally have been up or down. To be properly
considered the band of volatility or noise should be measured only using days on
which there was no firm-specific news, but this is rarely done as it involves timeconsuming analysis. See TABAK &DUNBAR, supra note 135, at 8.
" Coefficients tend to be calculated by taking a block of time without
separating one day from another, depending on the existence ofnews on particular
days. In fact, an examination of prior sensitivities of prices to particular types of
news may be revealing. See Simmonds et al., supranote 7, at 163. In addition, one
should be leery of default assumptions; they lead mechanically to shoddy analysis.
A prime example is the equal probability assumption of the proportionate decay
model often used incorrectly in estimating the number of shares possessed by
plaintiffs eligible to collect damages. See, e.g., In re Clearly Canadian, Sec. Litig.
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 90,664 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Janet Cooper Alexander, The
Value ofBad News in Securities Class Actions, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1421 (1994).
Judge Sneed, in his influential concurring opinion in Green v. Occidental
Petroleum, 541 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1976), inveighed against "subjecting the
wrongdoer to damages [based upon the magnitude of the drop in stock price] the
incidence of which resembles that of natural disasters." Id. at 1344. This theme is
found in what is perhaps Cicero's greatest oration: "Whereas if I had been
obligated to make the same speech at that previous period, no one would have
listened to me at all. It was not that the case was different then. Indeed, as I have
said, it was precisely the same. But the times were entirely different." CICERO,
MupDmE TRbLs 169 (Michael Grant trans.,, 1990). "Some ofthem, as I shall show
you, bore a closer resemblance to convulsjons of nature, or hurricanes, than to
processes at law." Id. at 175. "This was an excellent illustration of a frequently
noted phenomenon. The sea is habitually calm; but under the impact of strong
142
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drops measured by conventional statistical methodologies appear to be
abnormal and statistically significant. However, while on most occasions
stock prices stay within rough statistical norms, the market may exhibit
abrupt, extreme conduct. 45 Moreover, these extreme price changes occur
many times more frequently than a normal bell-shaped curve would
predict.1" The statistical curve that more accurately describes the amount
by which market prices change does not taper down to insignificance at the
beginning and the end of the curve. The curve has "fat tails."147 Benoit
Mandelbrot has termed these extreme market aberrations the "Noah effect"
for extreme price discontinuity (prices may jump or fall enormously in an
instant) and the "Joseph effect" for extreme price persistence (prices may
stay at a certain level for a seemingly inordinately amount of time). 48
Although the bell-shaped curve is recognized as inaccurate, accuracy is
sacrificed to tractability.
Ironically, the case ofBasic, Inc. v. Levinson,'49 in which the Supreme
Court decided to adopt FOM, was argued a few days after the stock market
crash of 1987. The crash raised grave doubts regarding the theory of
efficient markets because prices seemed to have dropped a very large
amount without any comparably large change in business fundamentals or
any significant news."' Since the crash, it has been increasingly appreciated that markets are not always proportional in the sense that a particular
quantum of cause will not necessarily produce a proportionate quantum of
effect. Occasionally, a small cause will appear to produce an apparently
disproportionate result. 5 ' In an indirect causal sequence, a relatively minor
winds it becomes rough and stormy. The people of Rome are just the same. When
left to themselves, they are peaceful. But, the speech of a demagogue... can whip
them up with the effect of a furious hurricane." Id. at 210.
'" See Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes:
The LinearGenealogy ofthe Efficient CapitalMarketHypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 546, 595 (1994) (Times of great plenty continued seemingly forever, only
to change as abruptly as the seven fat cattle in Pharaoh's dream were devoured by
the seven skinny. This was followed by times of extreme desolation and
desperation, seemingly without end.).
'"See Benoit B. Mandelbrot, A MultifractalWalk down Wall Street, ScI. AM.,
Feb. 1999, at 70.
"4
Simmonds et al., supra note 7, at 147 & n.78.
48
1 See EDGAR E. PETERS, CHAOs AND ORDER IN THE CAPITAL MARKETS 108,
234 (1991) (explaining Mandelbrot's terminology).
14'
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
SOSee Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5
Damages:A Legal,Economic, andPolicyAnalysis,47 STAN. L. REV. 7,12 (1994).
' For a history of the efficient market hypothesis, see Cunningham, supra note
145.
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securities "fraud" is a tam, or one in which the individual defendants did
not act with a great deal of scienter (or fault). Normally, this should not be
associated with a particularly significant price movement. If there is a
seemingly disproportionate price movement, it should be due in large part
to other confounding causes, including apparent abnormalities in the way
the market prices the value of news due to varying initial conditions. 52
The term "sensitive dependence on initial conditions" comes from
chaos theory. It means that in a dynamic system, one which is non-linear
and has three or more variables interacting, the effect that an event has will
depend greatly on the specific conditions under which the event happens. 53
The proverbial example is the "straw that broke the camel's back." The
straw, weighing less than an ounce, broke the back of the camel because of
the condition of the camel's back; namely, it already bore an enormous
weight at the time the straw was added. However, the example of the straw
that broke the camel's back is extremely unusual; the camel's back had
reached a critical breaking point. But as the causal chain lengthens, the
disproportionality of causes and effects is much more common. The
probability of disproportionate results multiplies as the number of events
in the causal chain increases. This deviation (of the effect produced by a
cause) from the linear, proportionate path is also known as "path
dependence." 54 In other words, the particular path a cause takes will
An example of sensitive dependence upon initial conditions in the securities
markets is that a stock, with a sky-high price earnings ratio can be sent plummeting
to earth by a snippet of bad news.
" See, e.g., Cunningham, supranote 145; Edward S. Adams et al., At the End
of Palsgraf, There isChaos:An Assessment ofProximate Causein Light ofChaos
Theory, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 507 (1998).
" See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theoiy ofPathDependence in
Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REv. 127 (1999); S.J.
Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, PathDependence,Lock-In, andHistory,11 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 205 (1995) (The article is critical of,butprovides useful background
regarding the theory of path dependence.). Note, if the chain of indirect causes are
events, the probability of all of the events happening is the probability of each of
the events multiplied by the others. Where each of the events are independent, then
the probabilities are simply the product of the multiplication of each. However, the
probabilities may be dependent or conditional. For example, the occurrence of
event A may make the occurrence of event B more or less probable. An example
of probabilities along a causal chain is a case of a plaintiff whose lawyer failed to
obtain building permits. The plaintiff claims that if he had obtained the permits he
would have built a stadium, teams would have played in the stadium, fans would
have come, and he would have made a great deal of money. In a similar sequence,
had the lawyer obtained a liquor permit the plaintiffwould have leased the location
152

1999-2000]

INDIRECT CAUSATION

depend upon the resistance or encouragement the cause encounters along
the chain of indirect causation. The cause is like a traveling billiard ball;
the effect it produces depends on the path it takes. Where the sequence of
causation is indirect, as in three billiard balls (A, B, and C) striking one
another following a single pool shot, the effect of ball A on ball C, and
indeed the path ball A takes after it first strikes ball B, is sensitively
dependent on the precise position of ball B when ball A struck it. To make
the example more realistic, also imagine that all three balls are moving and
tugging at each other. From the perspective of the colliding balls, the effect
is as much due to the trajectory of the striking ball as to the position and
direction of the ball being struck. Thus, in a direct causal sequence where
Able shoots and kills Baker, the causation seems, and indeed may be,
obvious. But in an indirect causal sequence, for example, where Able told
Baker, who told Connor, who told Don, who told Edgar, the effect on
Edgar at the end of the causal chain may be quite different from the
cause-Able's statement to Baker at the beginning. Moreover, in an
indirect causal sequence the effect of a cause may be largely, ifnot entirely,
unpredictable ex ante. One has to parse out the causes ex post.
The tam ox that gored was considered autonomous from its owner. So
too the market is (or at least appears to be) autonomous from investors; the
proverbial "invisible hand" of the market is at work. Although market
prices should in theory reflect investors' consensus as to value, on occasion

and opened a bar, patrons would have come, and the plaintiff would have made a
great deal of money. In such instances, where the plaintiff seeks to recover
consequential damages, the plaintiffs prior track record is important. Absent a
track record such damages are too speculative and inappropriate. See Kenford Co.
v. County of Erie, 493 N.E.2d 234 (N.Y. 1986); Brown v. Samolin & Bock, 168
A.D.2d 531 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); Creative Inception, Inc. v. Andrews, 50
A.D.2d 553 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975).
This is demonstrated by the "want of a nail" fallacy. For want of a nail the shoe
was lost. That may be probable. For want of a shoe the horse was lost. That may
be probable. For want of a horse the rider was lost That maybe probable. For want
of the rider the message was lost. That may be probable. For want of the message
the battle was lost That may be probable. For want of the battle the kingdom was
lost That may be probable. Yet even though each causal link is more probable than
not, it is not probable that for want of a nail the kingdom was lost
Assume that there are four independent subsequential causal links and the
likelihood of each is slightly more than 50%. The joint probability of all occurring
is roughly 6.25%, as follows:
50 x 50 x 50 x 50 = 6.25
100 100
100 100
100
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prices stray far from values. The market will occasionally do things that
investors do not intend to happen. These fluctuations seem abnormal and
unexpected to investors. Therefore, while no one would dispute that the
market is proverbially as "strong as an ox," some might feel that on
occasion it appears as though it were proverbially as "dumb as an ox" as
well. At best, the market's message is Delphic-the price and no
more-and fickle to boot. The market does not say what to buy or sell or
at what price. The market does not even reveal how many shares were
bought at an inflated price. Since share velocity is unknown, even when the
case on liability is lost by the defendant, the judgment will only be in the
amount of mispricing per share (a few dollars or cents), not in the
aggregate."5 6 A per share rather than an aggregate judgment does not have
to be bonded in order to pursue an appeal. After the first stage of the trial,
there are further proceedings in which the owners of shares who are eligible
to claim damages are invited to come forward to make a claim. In response
to those who make a claim, the defendants have the right to attempt to rebut
the presumption of reliance afforded by Basic, Inc. v. Levinson.'5 7
An example was the 1998 bond crisis set off by the Russian default and the
Long Term Capital Management near-default. See Alan Cowell, And the Band
Played On, N.Y. TIMMs, Mar. 12, 2000, § 3, at 5, col. 1 (reviewing NICHOLAS
DUNBAR, INvENTING MONEY (1999)).
156 The velocity of share turnover is important: Assume 100 million shares
traded hands. Did 10 million shares turn over ten times, 20 million shares turn over
five times, 50 million shares turn over twice, or 100 million shares turn over once?
Damages are two, five, or ten times as much depending on the degree of last-infirst-out ("LIFO") or first-in-first-out ("FIFO') share turnover assumed (i.e., the
degree to which one assumes the last share bought was the first share sold or the
first share bought was the first share sold). Where the inflation band is increasing,
as is typically the case, the higher the share velocity, the lower the number of
damaged shares. The projected number of damaged shares in a high-velocity
market is like Chichikov's serfs in Gogol's Dead Souls: truly invisible hands of the
market for they do not exist! Indeed, assuming an increasing inflation band and
extreme LIFO turnover, damages approach zero. Conversely, assuming a declining
but highly volatile inflation band, when damages are measured at small intervals
using an extreme FIFO turnover, damages approach infinity. Reality, gauged a
variety of ways, tends to be closer to the former. Data of actual share ownership
should be gathered and analyzed empirically and an appropriate multi-trader model
used as well. See Andrew R. Simmonds, Fraud-on-the-Market,The Questfor
MispricingandtheSearchforthe Class-IsAny One Out There?, in PRAC. L. INST.
1992 SEcuRxrrs LrIG. Vol. 2 at 555; see also Kenneth R. Cone & James'E.
Laurence, HowAccurate areEstimatesofAggregate Damagesin SecuritiesFraud
Cases?, 49 Bus. LAw. 505 (1994); Simmonds et al., supra note 7, at 132.
117 Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
155
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Just as the microstructure of causation between the two oxen in the
GOR was a mystery, for the most part the microstructure of the stock
market has been a mystery as well.158 Often, for various reasons, relatively
few shareholders ever make claims. The lack of damaged shares (despite
the enormous recorded volume of trades), the failure of eligible shareholders to receive or respond to claims notices, and the inherent disinterestedness of many shareholders in making claims acts as another de facto
limitation on the exposure presented in securities litigation.
X. A CASE IN POINT: THE NUMBERS GAME
Like oxen that herd or team together, the constituencies that make up
the market also interact with each other on an ongoing basis. Where there
is interaction, it is not just the defendant's misrepresentation that causes the
market price to change by some amount; other forces within the market
itself contribute to the change in price as well. It is not only the goring ox
that is active; often the victim is also involved in the circumstances that led
up to its death. Corporations and would-be investors in their shares interact
indirectly through the market. The market does not necessarily merely relay
information from a particular corporation to potential buyers of the
corporation's securities. The parties on either end of the chain of causation
act upon their set of information, such as it is.
A proverbial example is the situation where a company misses its
earnings by only a penny,15 9 yet its share price declines significantly.
Indeed, earnings estimates do not have to be missed to trigger a deluge. 160
According to SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, the cause of such anomalies is
often the routine and widespread practice of corporations communicating

"' The "invisible hand" of the market in Adam Smith's time was compared to
the engineer in the pit at a French opera who makes all the stage machinery work
with wheels and movements, but is never seen. See IAN SIMPsON Ross, THE LIFE
OFADAM SMITH 167 (1995).
59
See Gretchen Morgenson, ForecastsMade Rosyfor Investors, But Results
Are Sometimes Paler,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1999, at Al ("A penny is not worth
much nowadays except, oddly enough, on Wall Street. There, a penny a share in
company earnings can mean the difference between a stock that soars and one that
skids."); see also Francois Degeorge et al., Earnings Management to Exceed
Thresholds, 72 J. Bus. 1 (1999).
,"o See Morgenson, supra note 159 ("Word from an influential analyst that
[Qualcomm] would meet but not exceed earnings estimates sent the stock
tumbling.").
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with major investors and analysts "in a game of nods and winks."'' This
practice not only raises concern regarding "selective disclosure,"' 62 but
more pertinently indicates that the market creates both the message and
the environment that gives the message its meaning. Fred Schwed put it
best in his Wall Street classic, "Where Are the Customers' Yachts?": the
market is composed of "thousands of erring humans, of various degrees of
good will, solemnly engaged in the business of predicting the unpredictable." 63
Analysts and other pundits are rewarded for correctly predicting the
future, which in its most tangible form is the amount of the subject
corporation's next earnings announcement. Quite naturally, in this
uncertain endeavor they look to the company for "guidance." But critics,
such as perennial accounting gadfly Abraham Briloff, "fault[ ]analysts for
spending so much energy trying to predict quarterly earnings... inciting
company managements to jump through hoops to make the numbers."'"
Moreover, due to the uncertainties of the business (such as "hockey
sticking" of sales) 6 5 corporate managers cannot predict what their numbers
will be until after, at the end, or close to the end of the quarter. Thus,
analysts predict what the future number will be relying in part upon
statements or hints from the company when both realize that the informa-

Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, Remarks
entitled "The 'Numbers Game"' delivered at the N.Y.U. Center for Law and
Business (Sept 28, 1999) (transcript available from theN.Y.U. Center for Law and
Business). See also Carol J. Loomis et al., Lies, Damned Lies, and Managed
Earnings, FORTUNE, Aug. 2, 1999, at 74; Gretchen Morgenson, When a Rosy
PictureShould Raise a RedFlag,N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1999, at 6.
162 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No.
7787, Exchange Act Release Act No. 42,259, 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240, 243, 249
(1999) (Dec. 20, 1999) (giving excellentbackground regarding selective disclosure
to analysts); John C. Coffee, Jr., Securities Law Selective disclosure,NAT'L L.J.,
Mar. 11, 2000, atB5.
163
FRED ScHWED, JR., WHERE ARE THE CusToMERs' YACHTS? 195 (1940).
"6Thomas S. Mulligan, Can You Trust the Numbers? SEC Turns Up the Heat,
L.A. TIMES, May 23, 1999, at Cl. Abraham Briloff is a rdtired accounting
professor at Baruch College of the City University of New York. See id.
165 "Hockey sticking" refers to the appearance on a graph ofsales figures during
a quarterly accounting period. Sales levels remain flat until late in the quarter when
they spike upwards. A disproportionate amount of the company's sales in each
quarter occur late in the period, thereby reducing predicability. See Greg Ip,
Analyst Discovers Order in the Chaos of Huge Valuationsfor Internet Stocks,
WALL ST.J., Dec. 27, 1999, at Cl.
161
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tion they are giving and receiving is relatively unreliable and the exercise's
only purpose is to drum up interest.
Naturally, where the criterion of success is to meet or beat expectations
about earnings results, many corporations and their managers do just that.
Purportedly, almost twenty percent of the recent corporate earnings reports
followed by First Call came in at a penny over the analysts' consensus
estimates. 1" Chairman Arthur Levitt regards the "Numbers Game" as an
incentive for managers to "smooth" financial results, using such devices as
"cookie jar" and "big bath '167 accounting to create reserves for rainy days.
Yet investors, judging from their investment decisions, do not seem to
dislike "smoothing" until it abruptly stops. 6 ' They appear to like the
predictability it provides. Of course, that some investors for a time liked
"smoothing" does not mean that Chairman Levitt is incorrect in wanting
Wall Street to change its longstanding ways. It does, however, elucidate the
problems investors face in claiming to be victims of "fraud" when like
soldiers, sailors, pirates, fishermen, cargo and ship owners, and owners of
oxen, they are all in the venture together. 69 Much of the problem is the
" See Gretchen Morgenson, Market Watch; The Earnings Waltz: Is the Music
Stopping?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 24, 1999, § 3, at 1; John C. Bogle, Speech entitled
"Viewpoint: Mutual Fund Investment Policies and Corporate Governance"
Delivered at the Corporate Governance and Shareholders Rights Committee
Meeting, The New York Society of Securities Analysts (Oct. 20, 1999).
167 The "smoothing" of numbers refers to artificially making results of operations appear, from an accounting point of view, to be more uniform over time
than they really are. "Cookie jar" accounting refers to maintaining hidden sources
of money to take in as income from an accounting perspective as desired. "Big
bath" accounting refers to taking large losses currently so as to make future
operations appear more profitable. See Stephanie N. Mehta & Ann Grimes,
Gambits and Gadgets in the World of Technology, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 1999, at
B4.
'"8 See Bogle, supranote 166 ("Louis V. Gerstner Jr., chairman of I.B.M., had
been a master of the earnings game until last Thursday when he stunned investors
with a 1 percent [sic] drop in hardware sales in the third quarter and forecast
weakness in coming quarters. I.B.M. shares fell 15 percent." Analysts have been
able to somehow predict the earnings of General Electric within 2% of actual
results for the past 10 quarters in a row, an accuracy said to be a one-in-a-billion
chance. "Wall Street clearly endorses the managed earnings that corparate America
targets."); see also JOSHUA

RoNEN & SIMCHA SADAN, SMOOTHING INCoME

NUMBERS: OBJECTIVES, MEANS, AND IMPLICATIONS (1981).
' 69 See William 0. Fisher, The Analyst-Added Premium as a Defense in Open

Market Securities Fraud Cases, 53 Bus. LAW. 35 (1997) (arguing that when a
company is not responsible for analysts' too-rosy forecasts, damages should be
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market-wide charade that information has a greater predictive value than
it really has. As Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan put it, "[F]rom time
to time... investors suffer an abrupt collapse of comprehension of, and
confidence in, future economic events.... [T]his type of behavior has

characterized human interaction with little appreciable difference over the
generations. Whether Dutch tulip bulbs or Russian equities, the market
price patterns remain much the same."'170 Sharp drops tend to occur when
investors have placed extraordinarily high values on stocks. According to
one pundit:
Since investors buy growth stocks for what they will be earning many
years later, a tiny change in outlook can have a drastic impact on the
present value of the company's lifetime earnings.... [It is like] a piece
of artillery aiming wrong by one degree. If the target is 10 feet away, it
makes no difference. If the target is the moon, it will miss by thousands
of miles. 171
However, this logic is fallacious. It is probably naive to think that one
can hit the moon, Jules Verne-style, by a well-aimed shot from the Earth.
Presumably, adjustments to the course will be required along the way. The
cause of a stock price drop in these circumstances is not solely the fault of
management in misprojecting by a small amount. No great meaning should
be ascribed to small or transitory differences.' 7 2
reduced by the price inflation thereby caused).
17'
Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board, Remarks entitled "New
Challenges for Monetary Policy" Delivered at a Symposium Sponsored by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City in Jackson Hole, Wyoming (Aug. 27, 1999)
(available at <http://www.bog.frb.fed.us/boarddocs/speeches/1999/19990827. htm>)
(last updated Aug. 27, 1999).
171 Greg Ip, When Bad Things Happen to Big Firms: Volatility Now Rocks the
LargerStocks, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 1999, at Cl.
72
' Anumber

of courts have found news objectively immaterial notwithstanding
an accompanying large stock price drop. See, e.g., Klein v. General Nutrition Cos.,
186 F.3d 338 (3d Cir. 1999) (comparable same-store sales declined by 3% to 6%
and price fell to $14.00; price had been $21.50 in a public offering less than four
months earlier); Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 547 (8th Cir. 1997)
(finding an overstatement of assets by 2% of net worth not material); Glassman v.
Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 621, 633 & n.26 (1st Cir. 1996) (ruling a
"minor drop of a few percent [between 3% and 9%] is not adequate to support the
claim that the difference in backlog levels between quarters was material;" stock
price fell 30% in one day); Inre Convergent Tech. Sec. Litig., 948 F.2d 507, 511,
514 (9th Cir. 1991) (ruling a 10% quarterly revenue shortfall immaterial; stock
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The SEC's response has been that if the market considers the immaterial (the proverbial "penny a share" miss) material, so will the SEC. Therefore, the SEC recently announced that auditors should not rely exclusively
on quantitative benchmarks, particularly the well-known five percent test
of materiality. 73 The SEC recognizes that objectively immaterial causes
seem to cause disproportionate material consequences in securities prices.
In the SEC's view, this should require heightened disclosure." But, from
a damages standpoint, this should not create responsibility for sensitive
initial conditions that cause disproportionate causes and effects. For
example, at the end of 1999, Cisco Systems, Inc. had a price to earnings
ratio of more than 100, while Qualcomm, Inc. had a price to earnings ratio
ofmore than 300!175 With such high valuations, a small surprise in earnings
might start an avalanche in share value. Does that mean that the managers
of these companies are obliged to gauge trends better than managers of
companies with much lower price to earnings ratios? If the stock prices of
the currently highflying internet "dot com" companies with enormous stock
prices and scant earnings come tumbling down, as it has been widely
predicted they will, who will be to blame? The GOR and FOM would
suggest that, since the connection between information (both from the
corporation and the market) and the demand for the corporation's stock is
indirect and attenuated, not all of a severe decline in price that accompanies
information entering the market should be recoverable as damages.
XII. CONCLUSION

The reminder of the Goring Ox Rule for the fraud on the market theory
is that indirect causation produces disproportionate results.'76 Therefore,
price declined 17% in two days.); Wenger v. Lumisys, Inc., 2 F. Supp.2d
1231,1238, 1248-49 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (holding an 8% quarterly revenue and 9%
quarterly earnings shortfall immaterial; stock price had risen from $8a share to $30
and then fell to $7); Shuster v. Symmetricom, Inc., 1997 WL 2694490 at *8 (N.D.
Cal. 1997) (finding the alleged fraudulent transaction representing only 2% of
quarterly revenue not material); In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F.
Supp. 746, 750 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (holding a 5% quarterly revenue shortfall
immaterial; stock declined from $45 to $22); Ferber v. Travelers Corp., 802 F.
Supp. 698 (D. Conn. 1992) (concluding that a failure to disclose $585 million in
second mortgages representing 1% of assets and 3% of real estate portfolio was
immaterial).
173 See 1999 SEC STAFF AccTG. BULLETiN.
1745 See id.
17See Greg Ip, OlderInternetStocks Lose Spark; But Other Web Names Grab
Torch,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 1999, at Cl.
176 See DAUBE, Direct andIndirectCausation,supra note 28.
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scienter is inversely correlated to causation. The more indirect the
causation, the more the unforeseen consequences that arise from one's acts,
and the greater the culpable conduct needed to achieve one's goals. (Or
conversely, the more direct the cause, the more certain the effects and the
less culpable the conduct required.) Thus, where damages are indirectly
caused, the lower the level of culpable conduct, all things being equal, the
lower the resultant harm due to the wrong and the lower the causally
related and recoverable damages. 7 7 A lesser amount of culpable conduct
in securities litigation suggests a lower amount of causally related
damages. Oftentimes, fraud is a dynamc process in which the malefactor,
in communicating with the market, modifies his or her actions in response
to investors' reaction to the market's reaction. In this situation the indicia
of fraud are the communications back and forth between the malefactor and
the market qua transmitter of information, and the investor and his "unpaid
agent," the market qua valuer of information.
In our system of a relatively low standard for fault, a single instance of
scienter may suffice to create liability (unlike the muad or "thnce-warned"
standard of the GOR required for the imposition of full damages). Hence,
as in the GOR, the rule of partial damages applies. Where the investor
relies upon the market to be his "unpaid agent," the investor should absorb
the portion of Ins "loss" ascribable to "Ins unpaid agent." It is because of
the indirectness of causation in FOM securities litigation that a rule of
splitting the loss or lesser recovery is appropriate. This can occur by an
apportionment of the investor's loss among the various causes that
contributed to it and only awarding in damages that portion attributable to
the defendant's actions.
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See id.

